835.01/495: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina ( Armour ) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:47 p.m.]
1389. Espil tells me he was called to Ministry urgently by Peluffo last night. Latter said recognition matter must be dealt with promptly. May 25 incident was now finished chapter and he was disposed to do everything to bring about a solution compatible with Argentine sovereignty. He had discussed matter with other members of Cabinet and had full authority to deal with question. For this reason he desired another talk with me with Espil present. Before doing so, however, he wished to discuss question with certain officers of Junta who must be won over. He expected to have this meeting Friday (tomorrow) in which case his talk with me would probably take place Saturday. He said Farrell is making speech Sunday in which recognition question will be referred to. Peluffo did not indicate what line Farrell will take but Espil thinks he may use occasion to refer to action already taken by Government to implement break and the policy to be followed by Government in getting rid of Axis diplomats. I told Espil I would be glad to see Peluffo outside and privately but hoped he would have something definite to offer.
I plan to follow line decided upon in my last talk with Spaeth15 attempting to secure from Peluffo definition of what they mean by full implementation of break and what actions they propose to take. I told Espil, that if Peluffo raises with me again the “sovereignty” argument I propose to tell him that the only country which has attempted to challenge Argentina’s sovereignty is Germany and suggest natural line for them to take is that break with Axis and acts to implement break are logical sequences of Axis threat: that they have been taken in their own self-defense and defense of continent and have [Page 275] nothing to do with United States pressure: that if Farrell in his speech Sunday could stress this point we might begin to get somewhere.
Espil said that following the May 25 incident an effort had been made by Nationalist extremists to force Government to have me and possibly certain other representatives declared persona non grata. Peluffo had opposed suggestion and Foreign Office had prepared memorandum showing dangerous consequences of any such extreme action. Matter had been discussed at two Cabinet meetings and idea had been rejected. It seems possible that these discussions brought home to Tore Moderatesa [more moderates?] in Cabinet necessity of finding a solution to present impasse.
Espil’s version explains concern of my good friend the Papal Nuncio who called on me 3 days ago much alarmed at report I was to be given my passports. Although I am afraid I treated matter somewhat facetiously he was not convinced and persuaded Spanish Ambassador16 to call on Peluffo and Farrell. Bulnes tells me that while he found nothing to confirm report, Peluffo was still bristling with “sovereignty” and ready to resign rather than give in to United States “pressure”. In contrast, Farrell was reasonable and apparently desirous of finding a solution and disposed to do something to get it which Bulnes strongly urged. Peluffo’s remarks to Espil 2 days after Bulnes’ talk with Farrell would indicate that Farrell’s and probably Perón’s more moderate views have been impressed upon Peluffo.