Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

835.01/333: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, April 13, 1944—6 p.m.
[Received 11:35 p.m.]

970. Until the beginning of this week it looked as if Cabinet changes were about to be made which would include elimination of Perlinger and the appointment to important Ministries of individuals who would inspire more confidence. During the past few days, however, there have been indications that Perlinger is gaining strength and that there is a possibility that a compromise deal will be worked out which would either leave him in the Cabinet or assure him indirect but effective participation in the Government.

It is not clear, and in the last analysis does not really matter, whether Perón lacks the strength to eliminate the extremists or whether he really prefers to work with them.

Delay in reaching a solution of the Argentine Government’s internal problem and the possibility of a compromise being reached between Perón and Perlinger suggest the desirability of some action being taken to precipitate matters. The Embassy has contemplated a number of possible ways to bring about a definitive solution of the impasse, ranging from recognition on strength of Cabinet changes to outright economic sanctions, and suggests that consideration be given to some such course of action as that set forth below.

In view of the possibility of an undercover deal with the Extreme Nationalist “Argentenista”⁹⁶ element I believe we would be justified in insisting that the Government first adopt and apply certain concrete political and economic defense measures which would necessarily be unacceptable to Perlinger group. With regard to the manner of making our position known, I am more than ever satisfied that it would be unwise for me to see Perón or any other member of the present Government or any of their emissaries. The Department will be in the best position to determine an alternative method of presenting our conditions.

As reported in Embassy’s numbers 959 and 962⁹⁷ the Government has announced elaborate ceremonies for the Day of the Americas including addresses by Farrell and Mason. I fear that if apparently favorable Cabinet changes follow upon or are accompanied by declarations of solidarity and readiness to cooperate in common hemisphere undertakings, some of the other Republics may consider that they can no longer withhold recognition. In order to prevent such a movement from getting out of hand the Department may wish to consider an immediate cautionary telegram to all missions indicating that we do not intend to recognize until there is concrete evidence in the form of significant anti-Nazi measures that the Government is no longer linked to the Extreme Nationalist and pro-German elements.

I recommend that our Government and the Republics which have not yet recognized should insist on some minimum action program along the following lines:

(1) Intervention and control of the principal Nazi business firms on conditions that would prevent their obtaining imported merchandise, would expropriate all such merchandise now in their stock, and would gradually lead to their liquidation or transfer to friendly national interest.

(2) Cessation of all Government dealings with firms on the Proclaimed and Statutory lists.

(3) Immediate detention by Argentine authorities of all Axis nationals deemed dangerous within the meaning of Resolution XX of the Committee for Political Defense.⁹⁸

(4) Liquidation of Axis propaganda media, including newspapers, magazines, printing establishments, radio and motion pictures.

(5) Intern Axis diplomats, Military Attachés and other agents who are still at liberty although official relations with the Axis have been severed.

(6) Establish methods of inspection of passengers, crews, and cargoes leaving Argentine ports for Europe which will assure discontinuance of smuggling to our enemies.

(7) Liquidation of all Axis organizations. That the foregoing is an essential minimum program is substantiated by Department’s circular airgram A–293 of March 27.

I believe that if the steps indicated are not taken before recognition it is doubtful that they will ever be taken. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that recognition is very much desired by the principal leaders of the Government, particularly the Perón–Farrell faction, and therefore constitutes a more powerful instrument than may be generally appreciated. The Government seeks recognition (1) to strengthen its internal position, (2) to obtain a greater and more effective participation in inter-American affairs and (3) as a necessary step to obtain a voice in discussions of post war plans and at any international conferences which may follow the cessation of hostilities.

In the meantime, it is of course essential, if we hope to achieve the objective outlined above, to hold in line the other American Governments that have not recognized the Argentine regime. It was with this problem in mind that the suggestions contained in my telegram no. 887, April 1, 1 p.m.⁹⁹ were made. Among the steps which it seems to me ought and could be taken in this direction are the following:

1. If recognition is accorded Bolivia on terms demonstrating its unqualified adherence to inter-American commitments, this should strengthen disposition of other Republics to insist upon similar adherence by Argentina and contribute to undermine prestige and influence of present regime at home and abroad.

2. Extend economic assistance to Uruguay to enable it to withstand Argentine pressure. Nature of such assistance and its timeliness is of first importance, rather than quantity involved. Specifically, the recommendations in Ambassador Dawson’s no. 338, April 11, noon,¹ with respect to anhydrous ammonia, liquid chlorine, carbon disulphate and newsprint would seem to merit immediate attention. Here again the publicity factor is of great importance and should be handled carefully. From this point of view for example it would seem an excellent move to publicize extent and character of Argentine economic pressure against Uruguay by sending liquid chlorine to Montevideo by plane. Publicity on this point would be calculated to counteract one of principal bases of Argentine anti-United States propaganda, namely alleged use of economic pressure. Another important factor would be an increase of shipping services to Uruguay, to which Uruguayan Ambassador apparently referred in interview with the Secretary of March 20.

3. Strengthen our present export policy toward Argentina by gradually and quietly cutting down on exports of all materials, whether in short supply or not, until the Argentine Government establishes controls which will insure that no imported materials reach our enemies. On this point it is essential to reject any isolated proposals by Argentine Government or agencies which in effort to obtain some urgently needed product offer minor political or economic defense controls as inducements. For example, recent assurance that Chilean prefabricated copper would not benefit enemy firms. It is obvious that any piecemeal concessions of this kind would render ineffective the threat of economic shortages and disruption of domestic economy and military rearmament, which now exists at least potentially.

4. Insist continually that such Republics as Brazil (chief Argentine supplier in 1943) and Chile (on such products as copper) restrict to the utmost their exports to this country.

5. In the implementation of this policy in whole and in part, for example in method of conveying to Argentine authorities what is expected of them in order to obtain recognition, every effort should be made to assure participation of other American Governments that have not extended recognition. Such cooperative action now would counteract growing tendency to look upon present problem as exclusively ours, and strengthen future continental unity.

Armour

96. Group of younger army and navy officers headed by Gen. Benjamin Menéndez.
97. Telegrams of April 12, not printed.
98. The resolution dealt with arrangements for the detection and expulsion of dangerous Axis nationals from the Americas. For text of the resolution, see Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, Annual Report, July 1943 (Montevideo, 1943), p. 73.
99. Post, p. 307.
1. From Montevideo, p. 1611.