835.00/2552: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:45 p.m.]
660. Yesterday Espil telephoned that Ibarra García was most anxious to arrange a secret meeting between me and Perón. I replied I felt that under the circumstances it would not be possible.
Today Espil came to see me. He said Ibarra considers such a meeting most important since he feels sure if I could put up the whole situation clearly and forcefully to Perón a satisfactory solution could be found. Ibarra has been appalled how little the colonels prominent [Page 261] in regime know of true facts. They (not Perón of course) knew nothing until Ibarra told them of Ramírez’ promise to me last July to break; they were convinced the rupture was brought about by direct pressure from us and that we are now trying to force them to declare war on the Axis. Ibarra said it was just as much in Perón’s interest as mine to keep such a meeting secret but he insisted some way must be found to exchange ideas. They had even at one moment considered sending a confidential agent (possibly Ibarra himself) to Washington as under present conditions Escobar is not being received, but Espil had advised against this for obvious reasons.
I told Espil I disliked idea of even an informal meeting with Perón. Aside from everything else it might seem acceptance on my part that Perón was running the Government. This might be true but I did not wish to appear to admit it. I said Perón and Farrell must know, as the Acting Secretary had pointed out in his statement Saturday, the policies and types of action necessary to elicit cooperation from us. Furthermore, appointment of a good Foreign Minister and certain changes in Cabinet, notably removal of Perlinger,90 were I felt essential first steps if they wished to show they mean business. Espil said this was true but he still felt a strong presentation of the case by me to Perón would be useful in breaking the deadlock. We left it that I would think it over but I held out little encouragement although I indicated I might be willing to meet Ibarra informally.
I should appreciate an expression of the Department’s views on advisability of such a meeting with Perón. Perón is key figure in Government and a clear and forceful presentation of our position might possibly cause him to take steps in direction mentioned in your press conference of March 4th, even to extent of making such Cabinet changes as would inevitably reorient this Government’s whole attitude. I personally am not so optimistic, and I fear possibility that lesser changes not far reaching enough to reassure us, might make it difficult for us and the other American countries to hold out longer in refusing to deal with regime. Even if a really important change should take place, I do not know the Department’s point of view sufficiently to judge whether we desire a solution that would permit relations with this Government under its present leadership regardless of the substitutions that must take place in its less important members.
Department may well prefer to have things continue as they are for the present in the possibility that events within the country will provide the solution; such possibility undoubtedly exists, but may take time to eventuate. In addition, my acceptance of the invitation might be interpreted by Perón as a willingness to bargain. I might also [Page 262] add that I have no confidence that Perón would not exploit our having met in any way that would advance his own [name?], very possibly to our own disadvantage.
Espil was particularly anxious not to have his name in any [way?] mentioned in connection with these talks he is having with me.
- Gen. Luis Cesar Perlinger, Minister of Interior.↩