Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

835.50/1–1244: Telegram

The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, January 12, 1944—9 p.m.
[Received January 13—3:39 a.m.]

99. Personal for the Secretary. I submit the following comments on your personal telegram 58, January 11, 9 p.m.

1. I feel definite action against Argentina in form of economic sanctions should be determined upon before proceeding to a statement such as that envisaged in paragraph 1 of your telegram. By action I do not mean freezing alone as this would not be sufficient but should include, a complete embargo by U. S. and the British on all exports to Argentina, or at least embargo on all articles essential to their economy to the end that they will really feel the effects. The inclusion of the British is essential. While such action involves risk of retaliation by this Government I do not feel they would dare to prevent for any appreciable period the export of meat, wheat, vegetable oils, etc. required by U. S. and the British as the economic impact on Argentine economy would be disastrous. It is possible, however, that they might attempt a bluff on major exports and might actually embargo exports of products not vital to Argentine economy such as minerals.

2. Once such action as we are prepared to take has been definitely decided upon and is ready to be put into effect then I feel that a strong indictment of Argentine Government would have a good effect. But here again the British should accompany us either in a joint or simultaneous statement including the announcement of the withdrawal of Ambassadors.

3. As to the form of statement I am afraid that if it is predicted [predicated?] upon the failure of Argentina to comply with its Rio commitments⁵ it would be open to three avenues of attack. First, since Rio our Government has been at pains to point out that no steps taken by us should be interpreted as pressure to secure compliance or as punitive for Argentina’s not having carried out its commitments. Second, with the exception of Resolution I⁶ the Government would maintain as they have in the past that the many decrees issued constitute effective implementation and the mere reading of such decrees would tend to convince those who do not know the facts. Third, this Government would probably welcome the opportunity to shift the discussion to the old controversy as to whether the Rio resolutions were really commitments or merely recommendations which has been their thesis. Is not the real basis for an indictment of the Argentine Government that they are a totalitarian government attempting to extend their system of government to other American Republics and that they have actually succeeded in the case of Bolivia? Would you not, therefore, feel that perhaps something along the following lines would be more effective both in Argentina and abroad particularly in the other American Republics? Such a statement might have the added advantage of enabling the British to participate in the declaration.

[“] Peace will be written on basis of a post war world comprised of community of nations having common ideals and objectives. There will be no place in this community of nations for totalitarianism in any form. Those countries having totalitarian types of government will not be accepted in the post war community. Recent events in Argentina would seem to indicate that people of that country will be deprived of rights and benefits accruing from membership in post war community of nations. It is felt that Argentine people are entitled to know the path along which their Government is leading them. All indications point to an increasing totalitarian dictatorship in Argentina, the ideals of which are contrary to those principles for which the United Nations are fighting. [”]

Here might follow references to Bolivia and the danger to continental security and the cause of the United Nations inherent in the situation. The statement could then close with the reference to the gravity of the situation and the fact that respective ambassadors are being directed to return for consultation.

4. It is difficult to estimate the effect here of any statement or action. It is problematical whether any statement would be allowed publication locally. Even if permitted it might be distorted or presented in a form calculated to indicate pressure and infringement of Argentine sovereignty. I feel, however, that our friends would understand it and be heartened by it; in fact I have already received indications from certain quarters that some action by us and the British is anxiously awaited. I feel that a statement alone even coupled with general freezing would not result in rallying the opposition forces to concerted action against the government. Coupled with action along lines suggested, however, it might have the desired effect although here again this would largely depend on the extent to which Argentine economy was effectively hurt. There would probably be reaction in certain elements along lines of “my country right or wrong” but here again such risks are inherent in any strong policy particularly in a country such as Argentina.

5. I do not feel that opposition forces are sufficiently advanced in their plans to be affected by steps envisaged (see Embassy’s telegram 85, January 11, 9 p.m.⁷).

Armour

5. For correspondence on the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15–23, 1942, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff.; for texts of the resolutions of the meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1942, pp. 117 ff.
6. This resolution has to do with the breaking of diplomatic relations by the American Republics with the Axis.
7. Not printed.