715.1715/1648

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Bonsal)9

After lunch at the Presidential Palace, the President received Ambassador Stewart and myself in his private office. I explained to him the personal concern of Secretary Hull in the boundary situation, adding that both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull are confident that neither Nicaragua nor Honduras will do anything to disturb the peace during the war emergency. I added, however, that this situation was obviously full of dangerous potentialities, and I pointed out that other boundary disputes are either in the process of settlement or have been completely settled, leaving the Honduras-Nicaragua situation as the only serious outstanding dispute between American republics.

I then outlined the respective positions of the two countries. The Honduran Government has for many years stood firmly upon the King of Spain’s award of 1906, refusing to consider any variation whatever from the line laid down in that award. On the other hand, Nicaragua rejects the award and has made a variety of claims the Río Aguan line, the Rio Patuca line, and a line running north of the Segovia River, roughly parallel to the river, from Cruta to about Totecacinte). I said that these two positions were obviously irreconcilable in the absence of considerable willingness to modify and even to sacrifice long-held aspirations on the part of both countries.

President Somoza did not listen to the above without interrupting. He spoke at some length regarding the invalidity of the King of Spain’s award because of the fact that the King had granted to Honduras more than Honduras had requested. He also spoke at some length of the noble and warlike character of the Nicaraguan people and of the fact that even he, with all his influence, would be unable to put across any arrangement which would seem to his people to be a sacrifice of legitimate Nicaraguan territory. He stated that the Nicaraguan position is extremely reasonable in that Nicaragua is willing not to press her claims to the Aguan and Patuca lines but does insist upon holding Cruta and certain territory north of the Segovia River. [Page 216] In the course of the conversation the President referred to a map apparently used in the Nicaraguan schools in which the Nicaraguan boundary is shown as extending from Cruta along a line which at no point touches the Segovia River—at least in its east-west course. This map shows the land north of the aforesaid line and east of the Aguan River as being “en litigio.”

I stated as emphatically as possible that a solution of this problem was essential, not only in the interests of inter-American solidarity and of the maintenance of the principle of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, but also because of the extremely prejudicial effect of the continuance of a dispute of this character on the development of the two countries concerned. The President had previously spoken in rather a light way about Nicaragua’s willingness to have the matter settled eventually by force of arms. I said that as long as the controversy remained unsettled both governmental and private investors desiring to cooperate in the economic progress of the two countries would necessarily have to consider the boundary matter as a most unfavorable factor. The President at a later point in the conversation admitted that even a poor settlement of the case at this time would be preferable to letting it hang on.

I then described to the President the tentative formula at which the Department had arrived and concerning which I was making confidential soundings on behalf of the Secretary. This formula is the following:

1.
Free access to the River Segovia for the citizens of both countries. (The President at first balked at this, thinking I was referring to the use of the river as a boundary and stating that in any case Hondurans very seldom reached the river and then only through a pass made by the River Patuca through the mountain chain to the north of the River Segovia.)
2.
The drawing of a line which would take into account the geographic realities encountered in the area.
3.
The line to be drawn should also take into account the realities of the situation arising from the fact that nearly 40 years have now elapsed since the King of Spain handed down his award and during that interval the boundary line has not been fixed on the ground.
4.
The drawing of the line could be turned over to a technical international body made up, preferably, of engineers and geographers rather than lawyers. I added that the technical body would be given fairly ample terms of reference but that I believed it would be necessary in general to describe its functions as being the execution of the Laudo,10 in order to avoid adverse repercussions in Honduras.

The President did not at first comment directly on this formula. He was most interested to learn exactly what boundary I thought might be the upshot thereof. In the course of a very general discussion [Page 217] of this matter he indicated a willingness to recede somewhat from the line from Cruta north of the Segovia River and indicated on the map a line from Cruta to the river at a point where navigation by launch appears to cease (this point may be about where the river enters the flat Atlantic Coast area).

The President was much interested in my description of the recent settlement between Costa Rica and Panamá, where the two countries, while “executing” an award handed down by Chief Justice White about 1914,11 made reciprocal territorial concessions in a wild and apparently valueless portion of the boundary territory. He suggested that the authority to recommend such reciprocal concessions be included in the powers of the technical group suggested above. The President was most emphatic as to the need for Nicaragua’s retaining Cruta and a certain amount of land between Cruta and the river.

In reply to a direct question, the President asked me to assure the Secretary of his desire to cooperate and of his willingness to make the utmost sacrifice consistent with the political feeling in Nicaragua regarding this question. He asked if it would be possible to obtain for him a written confidential proposal of some kind which he could discuss with his advisers. He also said that if I were to go to President Carías and tell him that the United States Government had brought pressure to bear on the Nicaraguan Government to force the latter to relinquish its claims to the Aguan and the Patuca, he, Somoza, felt sure that the Hondurans would be delighted and that a settlement could probably be reached. I ventured to differ with the President on this point, and I told him that Honduran feeling was entirely tied up with the Laudo, which prescribes the river bed12 as the boundary.

Our conversation ended with mutual protestations of good will and with emphasis by both sides on the need for moving this matter forward. I believe President Somoza to be sincere in his repeated statements as to the desirability of reaching a settlement now.

Philip W. Bonsal
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2316, June 12, from Managua; received June 20.
  2. The 1906 Award of the King of Spain.
  3. For text of the Award of September 12, 1914, by Chief Justice Edward D, White, see Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 1000; for correspondence concerning this boundary dispute, see ibid., pp. 993 ff.
  4. Segovia (Wanks or Coco) River.