Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII

710 Consultation 3A/668

The Ambassador in Uruguay (Dawson) to the Secretary of State

No. 4006

Montevideo, March 2, 1944.
[Received March 14.]

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 3931 of February 18, 1944,⁹⁶ in which I advised the Department of my intention shortly to present to the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs⁹⁷ a memorandum concerning measures deemed desirable on the part of Uruguay with a view to implementing the Rio de Janeiro⁹⁸ and Washington resolutions⁹⁹ and the recommendations of the Committee for Political Defense.¹

The memorandum in question was presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 1. The English text (a copy of which is enclosed for the Department’s files) was accompanied by a Spanish translation which had been carefully prepared by the Embassy.

In delivering the memorandum, I stated verbally to the Minister that it had been prepared following a study made by the Embassy of the economic, financial, administrative and political measures taken by the Uruguayan Government to combat the subversive activities of the Axis; that the Embassy’s study had revealed that there remained a good deal to be done in order to implement certain resolutions approved by the Uruguayan representatives at the Rio de Janeiro and Washington Conferences; that for this reason the Embassy ventured to indicate certain measures which it would be advisable to take and which had already been taken by many American republics; that I hoped that he would study the memorandum and that we could discuss it somewhat later; that I expected to discuss it also with the President;² that I hoped that he would understand that in presenting the memorandum my only desire was to be as helpful as possible, being convinced that the Uruguayan Government desired to do everything in its power to contribute to Hemisphere defense; and that I was convinced also that the Government realized that the danger had not ceased but that on the contrary it was necessary to strengthen defense measures against the Axis and its sympathizers.

Sr. Serrato said that he would proceed at once to study the memorandum. He asked me if it could be true that any other South American countries had taken more effective measures against the Axis than Uruguay, saying that this would surprise him. I told him that, while Uruguay had taken a courageous and leading stand politically, nevertheless it had not gone as far as certain other countries in putting into effect economic and financial controls and in some other respects. He remarked that it was his impression that Axis firms were practically out of business, to which I replied that they still contrived to continue their activities.

In the course of our brief conversation, he said that it should be borne in mind, in comparing Uruguay’s position with that of certain other countries, that Uruguay has not declared war and that it is not a dictatorship but a democracy in which Congress must be consulted and constitutional processes observed.

I shall seek an early opportunity of discussing the matter with the President to whom I shall also deliver a copy of the memorandum.

Respectfully yours,

William Dawson

[Enclosure]

The American Embassy in Uruguay to the Uruguayan Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Aide-Mémoire

During the last two months, the American Republics have been furnished with dramatic evidence of the continuing serious danger of subversive activities by Axis agents and sympathizers. The government of Bolivia was overthrown by a revolutionary movement³ in which there participated individuals who had long maintained close working relations with the Nazi organization both on this continent and in Europe. After full consultation nineteen of the republics freely and individually determined not to recognize the new regime.

The action with relation to Bolivia had scarcely been taken when the government of Argentina discovered a large network of Axis spies which jeopardized the sovereignty of the nation and the security of the continent. This discovery led to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Argentina and the governments of Germany, Japan and their satellites.

During recent weeks there have been important disclosures of subversive activities in Chile, Paraguay and Peru.

These events demonstrate conclusively that although much has been done by the American republics to defend themselves against Axis political aggression, much remains to be done to cope with the continuing danger. The same events demonstrate that a desperate enemy, suffering serious military defeats in Europe and Asia, may be expected to resort to extreme measures in this hemisphere.

The Embassy appreciates that the Government of Uruguay is not only alive to the danger but desires to take all measures necessary to protect the nation and the continent against attack by Axis political agents. It is for this reason and in the hope of rendering assistance that it is submitting the present memorandum which has been prepared after a careful review of the political and economic defense measures taken thus far. In this connection, the Embassy may be permitted to state that this review has revealed certain weaknesses in the defense structure of the country to which the Government will, it is believed, desire to give its urgent attention.

This memorandum deals with four specific problems with respect to each of which either the Foreign Ministers or representative inter-American defense bodies have made detailed recommendations which have induced vigorous and effective action by most of the American republics.

It will be observed that the measures discussed are responsive to the need for more adequate prevention of subversive activities. This objective of prevention has characterized most of the defense resolutions adopted by the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro, by the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control, and by the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense. The American republics have learned by bitter experience that laws for the prosecution of treason or espionage are not adequate to deter the commission of subversive acts. Such laws come into operation only after the damage has been done. In order to maintain the security of the state and avoid the loss of American lives, ships and property, thoroughgoing preventive measures must be adopted which will deny the enemy all opportunity to initiate subversive action. This principle is fundamental to the measures discussed below for (1) controlling the funds and economic enterprises of pro-Axis firms and individuals, (2) detaining and otherwise exercising effective control over dangerous individuals, (3) controlling travel to and from the country, and (4) preventing transmission through the mails or by telecommunications of information which may be of assistance to the enemy.

[Here follow detailed suggestions for action on each of the four subjects mentioned above.]

[Montevideo, March 1, 1944.]

96. Not printed.
97. José Serrato.
98. Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, January 15–28, 1942; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff.; for texts of resolutions, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1942, pp. 117–141.
99. The Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control, June 30–July 10, 1942; for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 58 ff.; for texts of resolutions, see Pan American Union, Congress and Conference Series No. 39: Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control (Washington, 1942).
1. For correspondence on The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, meeting at Montevideo, Uruguay, see pp. 1 ff.; for texts of the recommendations, see Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense, Annual Reports, April 15, 1942–July 15, 1943, and July 15, 1943–October 15, 1944 (Montevideo, 1943, 1944).
2. Juan José Amezaga.
3. For correspondence on the policy of the United States toward the new Bolivian Government, see pp. 427 ff.