817.00/7–1944
The Ambassador in Nicaragua ( Stewart ) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram no. 304, dated July 15, 6 p.m., 1944, concerning certain Nicaraguan efforts to involve the United States in Nicaraguan political affairs and the possibility that our attitude thereto may be misunderstood and require clarification. The Department’s telegram alludes specifically to the misuse of the American flag on July 4, 1944; to the order issued by Colonel Irving A. Lindberg, as President of the Junta de Control de Precios y Comercio, on July 6 to Nicaraguan merchants not to close their shops in support of the projected general strike, under penalty of sanctions; and to a press notice which stated that a high Nicaraguan official had given information to the effect that Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa had reported the receipt from the Secretary of expressions of sympathy for the “gentlemanly and skillful manner in which President Somoza was able to subdue the recent minor disturbances in Managua.”
In amplification of previously submitted reports regarding these incidents, the following is submitted:
The Embassy’s telegram no. 435, dated July 9, 12 noon, and its despatch no. 2379 of July 1012 described the so-called flag incident. There have been no subsequent attempts to use the American flag in unauthorized ways. It will be recalled that prior to the outbreak on June 27 of the recent political disturbances, President Somoza had determined to give unusual éclat to the celebration of our national holiday. He let me know through an aide what his plans were. I made two suggestions regarding them. I said that I hoped that the celebration might be one of all the people and not merely of the Liberal Party. I later, upon the Department’s suggestion, said that I hoped it would be as feasible for the President to address the crowd from a platform across the street from the Embassy as from the Embassy balcony. To both of my suggestions the President acceded. In my judgment, the outbreak of political disturbances should have counseled the President to abandon the July 4th celebration. Since I had not suggested that [Page 1400] the celebration be held, however, I did not think it proper for me to suggest to him that he abandon his plans, particularly since they were ostensibly contrived to do honor to our country.
I feel that it was wise not to pursue the suggestion made to me by Foreign Minister Argüello at the President’s request, and later by the President personally, that the Embassy make some statement deploring the use of the flag for partisan political purposes. In declining, I am sure that I was not unmindful of the respect due our flag, nor was I condoning its use for political purposes. I am sure that the President wanted such a statement—to indicate that the United States was supporting the existing administration in the political crisis and that we were unsympathetic toward the opposition. I am also sure that such a statement would have been widely publicized by President Somoza. Its effect, on the one hand, would have been to put ideas in the heads of the opposition for further misuse of our flag, and, on the other, it would have been an excuse for the President to resort to force to prevent it. The Embassy, of course, is unable to prevent the misuse of our flag in Nicaragua except by recourse to the constituted authorities, who would then have felt that they had a mandate from the Embassy to take whatever measures might be necessary to prevent it.
By refraining from any statement—which, in any event, seemed hardly justified by the circumstances of the incident—there have been no further incidents of the sort and the matter is now almost forgotten. If, by chance, it is felt that some action should have been taken at the time, I am convinced that no purpose would be served by resurrecting the matter now.
With reference to Colonel Lindberg’s order to merchants, which was the subject of the Embassy’s telegram no. 429, dated July 7, 12 noon, it should perhaps be pointed out that the order was issued and circulated before the Embassy was apprised of it. Colonel Lindberg issued it at the request of President Somoza. From the President’s viewpoint, it had in all probability two advantages. It was issued by an American, which could lead to the conclusion that the action was taken with the consent of the United States, and it was issued, moreover, by an American who has a reputation for strict enforcement of laws and regulations. Merchants thought that the Colonel’s order would be enforced.
The order was most effective. The general strike which was projected in imitation of that staged in San Salvador was a “fracaso” because of the order and because, also, labor decided to support the President (see the Embassy’s despatch no. 2394, dated July 13, 194413). The failure of the strike, the loyalty of the National Guard, and the [Page 1401] timely return to the “regular” Liberal fold of such prominent dissidents as ex-President Moncada14 and Senator Carlos A. Morales saved the day for President Somoza.
It may be argued in favor of Colonel Lindberg’s action, which proved so successful, that, as Acting President of the Junta de Control de Precios y Comercio (in the absence of Major Downing15), it was his duty to issue the order on being requested by the President. There may be some doubt as to this point, for such an order would seem logically to fall within the police power of the Ministry of Government. It would have been difficult for Colonel Lindberg to have refused to sign the order, however, and insistence of the President might well have forced his resignation over the point.
The control exercised by Colonel Lindberg and Major Downing over the Junta has been of inestimable value to the United States in controlling imports and distribution. From one viewpoint—granted that war conditions necessitated the setting up of such controls—it was very advantageous to have Americans in charge of their functioning; from another—and thinking in terms of after-the-war trade—it has been unfortunate that Americans were placed in the position of denying Nicaraguans import licenses and of setting ceiling prices at which American goods might be sold in Nicaragua.
The attitude of Major Downing in cooperating with the Embassy has been exemplary, and until the present incident we have had no cause to complain during the briefer incumbency in the Junta of Colonel Lindberg. In the present case, I feel that Colonel Lindberg should have consulted the Embassy before signing an order which had obvious political implications, and I would have been glad to have interceded with the President to relieve him of the necessity of doing so.
I believe it would now be proper, should the Department desire to instruct me in that sense, to remind Colonel Lindberg that he should henceforth take every precaution against becoming involved in Nicaraguan political affairs and that in any matter which presents political aspects he should consult the Embassy in advance. I feel that such a comment would be well taken by Colonel Lindberg, although I have no doubt he would report the matter to President Somoza.
With reference to the news item which appear[ed] in Flecha, issue of July 10, and which was reported in my telegram no. 440, dated July 11, 5 p.m., 1944, I entertain little doubt that the item was inspired either by Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa, by President Somoza, or by one of his henchmen. It appeared at a time when the President was eager to obtain any evidence, however small, that he had the support of the United States.
[Page 1402]The item, however, appeared in only one newspaper and, except for a protest to me by Deputy Octavio Pasos Montiel, no Other comment concerning it has come to the attention of the Embassy. The Nicaraguan public is accustomed to find items of this sort in its press and the form which it took may well have indicated that it was unofficial and unreliable. Its form, moreover, would prevent the placing of responsibility. Furthermore, it is now forgotten, and I doubt whether any action with reference to it would be desirable.
There can be no doubt that President Somoza is fully aware of the attitude of the United States with respect to intervention in Nicaragua’s political affairs. I have repeated to him time and again that we do not intervene, and, even without this, he is surely aware that non-intervention is one of the principal tenets of the Good Neighbor Policy—for us, for the other American republics, and for him. As has been elsewhere reported, the neutral policy of the Embassy during the recent disturbances in Nicaragua has proved that we mean what we say, if there was previously any doubt. So successful was our demonstration that, as I have also said elsewhere, the President has showed evidence of annoyance.
The opposition, likewise, has had every opportunity to weigh our neutral attitude. During the recent crisis, every oppositionist who called has been received either by me or by one of my officers. In every case, we have explained, after listening to the protests which have been advanced against President Somoza and his government, that their complaints are a Nicaraguan matter, in which we can take no part; that we are guests in this country; and that we can make no comment or venture any suggestions. The opposition, I am convinced, fully understands our attitude. However, it has not failed to criticize me and the Embassy for supporting the Somoza regime, although we have been most careful during the recent incidents not to do so—even incurring the President’s annoyance by our course.
In my opinion, any public attempt on our part to clarify our attitude to the opposition, or to the President, or both, would be tantamount at this time to intervention. If we indicated disapproval of the opposition’s use of our flag, the act would be seized upon by the President as United States support. On the contrary, if we voiced any criticism of the Government, it would be seized on by the opposition as a basis for further agitation and perhaps revolt. I am convinced that silent neutrality is the better course, and this is what I have been observing. Any other would give both offense to the Government and disturb the tranquillity which has recently returned to Managua—at least for the time being.
Respectfully yours,