740.0011 European War 1939/7–144: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State 58
[Received July 2—1:23 a.m.]
1198. I called on the Prime Minister today to support the British Ambassador’s representations in the matter of the rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. The following is the gist of an hour and a half’s conversation in the course of which I pointed out that the war was progressing so rapidly to the inevitable Allied victory that the present might be Turkey’s last opportunity to actively associate herself with the United Nations.
In outlining the Turkish position Saraçoğlu said that his Government did not understand and had been “hurt” by the British policy of “sulking” since the departure of the British Military Mission in February. He referred to the fact that the Turk embargo on chrome deliveries to Germany and the prohibition of the passage of certain classes of German ships through the Straits had failed to evoke any indication of appreciation from London. He remarked that when he had sent cordial messages to Eden and Molotov he had received a most cordial reply from Molotov and a “frigid” reply from Eden. He said that all in all his Government had come to doubt during recent months that Britain really wanted Turkey to enter the war. He knew the Russian position because the Russians spoke plainly and had made it clear that they desired Turkey’s entry into the war but insofar as concerned the British “their legalistic and devious methods of approach” had left the Turk Government perplexed as to Britain’s real desire with respect to Turkey’s entry into the war. As matters stood today whereas the Russian position was clear that Turkey’s entry into war was desired the British were requesting merely a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations with Germany. In consequence in the light of the relatively limited amount of war material previously requested by the Turks and the abrupt departure of the British Military Mission could the Turk Government be criticized for wondering whether the British were serious in their request at Cairo that Turkey enter the war? Could it be that British international interests of which the Turks had no knowledge dictated a rupture between Turkey and Germany without active participation by Turkey in the war?
The Prime Minister emphasized several times that the Turks “are a proud people” remarking that “if the British continue to treat us as slaves, inferiors or colonials nothing can be accomplished but if they treat us as full Allies, for example accord us the same treatment [Page 869] shown the refugee Governments in London which rule no countries, we are ready to go to the end of the road with the Allies”.
Saraçoğlu then made the following statement: “I have suggested to Hugessen that the British determine what additional war material we should receive and send their experts here for that purpose and have informed him that we will abide by their decision and will let the British fix the date for Turkey’s entry into the war.[”]
In outlining his views as to the part Turkey could play on entering the war Saraçoğlu stated that the Turk Army could eject the Germans from Bulgaria observing that he was convinced that within 48 hours after the Turk Army entered Bulgaria the Bulgarians “would shift over to our side”. He said that in his opinion Bulgaria would not offer prolonged or serious resistance to both Turkey and Russia observing that he assumed the Russians would be prepared to carry out the offer previously made to declare war on Bulgaria if Turkey entered the war. Thus he said the road to Yugoslavia would be opened and it would be for the British to decide whether they wished to cross the Adriatic into the Balkans.
Saraçoğlu then told me that the Council of Ministers would meet on July 3 to consider the reply to be made to the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany. He said that without undertaking to forecast the decision the Council of Ministers might arrive at, a negative reply to the specific Anglo-American request would not mean that the Turk Government was not prepared to discuss Turk entry into the war along the lines outlined above. I gained the impression from everything the Prime Minister said that the Turkish reply to the Anglo-American request will in effect amount to a proposal that Turkey enter the war. I also gained the impression that Saraçoğlu himself had not yet made up his mind as to how best to deal with the Anglo-American request for a rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. However he made it unmistakably clear that the Turk Government is much more interested in entering the war than in a mere rupture of economic and diplomatic relations. Thus if the Council of Ministers agrees to break off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany it will be in anticipation of Turkey’s entry into the war.
I am now more convinced than ever that the Turk Government is not only willing but anxious to enter the war and that if Turkey’s entry into the war at some time in the near future is deemed desirable for either political or military reasons this result can be achieved if account is taken in London of Turkish susceptibilities. I am persuaded that by offering to the Turks additional war material in quantities commensurate with the military operations to be undertaken by them, promising them that delivery will be made within the time agreed upon, assuring them of fighter protection for their principal [Page 870] cities and obtaining the assurance that the Russian Government will declare war against Bulgaria the Turk Government would undertake to enter the war as of an agreed date.
- Paraphrase sent to London as 5224 and to Moscow as 1606, July 2.↩