Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

740.0011 European War 1939/6–2844: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 28, 1944—midnight.
[Received June 29—1 a.m.]

2327. Molotov⁵¹ called me over this evening to explain developments regarding Turkey. He said that on May 27 the Turkish Government had approached the Soviet Government verbally but officially with a proposal that an agreement be reached envisaging closer political collaboration which would include consultation on Balkan questions.

In the first days of June the Soviet Government had replied pointing out that the Balkans were in the hands of Hitler, that as the Turkish Government was maintaining relations with Germany any consultation on the Balkans “would lose its meaning”, that the Soviet Government was ready to discuss closer collaboration with Turkey including consultation on the Balkans if Turkey broke with Germany and entered the war on the side of the Allies. Molotov further explained that they had had no answer to this Soviet counter proposal.

Molotov then went on to describe a communication he had received from the British Ambassador⁵³ on June 25 [in?] which the British Government asked the Soviet Government to support a British demand on Turkey to break diplomatic and economic relations with Germany as a first step toward getting Turkey into the war. Molotov said he had not as yet answered the British Government and asked me whether I knew what the attitude of my Government was in regard to the proposal of the Soviet Government to the Turks and the proposal of the British Government.

I replied that as far as I knew my Government had no previous knowledge of the Soviet-Turkish interchange but that I believed my Government would be prepared to support steps towards a break by Turkey with Germany in agreement with the British and Soviet Governments.

Molotov commented that the British proposal was not in accordance with the Moscow decisions.⁵⁴ We discussed at some length the arguments for the British proposal. I said that I understood we were not in a position to supply the large quantities of aircraft and arms which the Turks had demanded as a condition to their entering the war. Molotov said that these demands were only excuses and that we should not take them seriously. If we had expected Turkey to enter the war in 1943 it would not be logical to reduce our demands after our military successes which should be convincing to the Turks. He said that we had a right to present our demands although he [would?] not predict what the Turkish attitude would be. I then asked whether I could understand from what he said that the Soviet Government was opposed to the British proposal and wished the United States and British Governments to support their proposal for Turkish entry into the war immediately.

In reply Molotov said that the Soviet Government was studying the matter and had not come to a conclusion. In the meantime he was desirous of obtaining the attitude of the United States Government.

I agreed to cable you Mr. Molotov’s question and ask for your position. I am sure he would appreciate an early reply. Repeated to Ankara.

Harriman

51. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
53. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.
54. Concerning the agreement regarding Turkey reached at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see telegram from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt, November 2, 1943, and telegram from President Roosevelt to the Ambassador, November 4, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 697 and 698, respectively.