811.20 Defense(M)Turkey/1047: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 3—12:32 a.m.]
998. Department’s 489, May 31. As Department has solicited my views I feel free to express following.
[Page 858]I cannot follow London’s reasoning that maintenance of constant pressure on the Turks between now and launching of second front will operate as a threat to Germans. Quite the contrary the pressure which has been applied has been known to Germans and has evidenced a divergence of views between Britain and her ally Turkey, a divergence which has been publicized by discussions in British and Turkish press and referred to by Churchill in his recent public statement. Thus the continued maintenance of pressure would indicate continuation of divergence and continued Turk opposition to British desires which Germans know full well to be reduction in shipment of strategic materials to Axis, ceding of Turk bases or Turkey’s entry into war. On other hand sudden cessation of pressure accompanied by a pubic announcement of an agreement between Britain, the United States and Turkey, without disclosing details, would lead the Germans to believe that the agreement perhaps even transcended anything that might be published regarding the details. It follows from the foregoing that if it is desired to cause the Germans anxiety as to the position of Turkey at the moment of the opening of second front this result is much more likely to be achieved by a sudden and well publicized change in Anglo-Turkish relations than by continuing a policy of emphasizing disagreement.
I am at a loss to follow the argument that when Numan objects to continued pressure by contending that what is asked is tantamount to a rupture of relations with Germany the British “will let him argue like this until the attack opens and then tell him frankly that this [is] what is wanted”. I don’t see what the British will gain after the attack has opened by telling Numan “frankly” that a rupture of relations with Germany is what is wanted as they have been telling him this since December.
With reference to Department’s preliminary thinking that the signature of anything containing terms at this stage might greatly reduce the field to which “constant pressure” might be applied I am inclined to the view that even after the agreement has been signed an adequate field for pressure will remain in endeavoring to curtail the export of the remaining 50% and in other domains. Insofar as concerns not relieving Numan from his dilemma it would seem that he would be relieved by the non-acceptance of the substantial concessions offered by him much more than by their acceptance for on their acceptance he is on notice that further demands will shortly be made.
In the light of the over-all situation I have no reason to change or modify the recommendations contained in my 969 [965], May 27, other perhaps than to stress further the advantages to be derived from a publicized agreement before the opening of the second front.