740.00112 European War 1939/5–2644
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
The following represents the substance of a telegram received from the Foreign Office on May 26th, in which the Foreign Office give an account of the present thinking of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of policy towards Turkey in the immediate future:—
As a result of the Turkish chrome decision and the general reorientation of Turkish policy in our favour, the question has again been brought up whether we should not on the eve of operations in the West increase the threat to Germany’s position in the South-east of Europe through Turkey by reestablishing military contacts with the Turks. In recent months the importance of maintaining this threat has greatly influenced our Turkish policy, but since the breaking off of military conversations in February, the threat has been a very distant one. A number of hints have been thrown out recently that the Turks would be ready for a resumption of military talks, and it must not be forgotten that in January the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs offered to give us an assurance that Turkey would come into the War within one fortnight of a successful landing in the West. The despatch of a military mission to Angora might therefore seem at first sight an admirable means of increasing German anxieties.
[Page 853]2. We are not however any longer prepared to pay any price for Turkey’s entry into the War at this stage, although if she were to come in voluntarily and at her own request her entry would be welcomed. A military mission therefore would have nothing to discuss and this fact would become immediately obvious to the enemy. Moreover its arrival would be hailed by the Turks as a victory for their previous policy of non-cooperation and our position would be correspondingly weakened.
3. On the other hand we have several indications that our economic policy has been taken by Germany as an attempt on our part to push Turkey into the War by economic pressure after having failed to do so by direct military conversations. We feel therefore that our best means of maintaining the threat to the Germans through Turkey is to continue to concentrate our attention on the economic field. The action which is being taken by the United States and British Governments in that field will enable us to keep up constant pressure between now and the launching of the attack on the West. In reply to our pressure the Minister of Foreign Affairs will doubtless use his old argument that the reductions in Turko-German trade which we are asking for amount to a rupture of relations. We will let him argue like this until after D day and then on, say, D + 4, we shall, if we want to tell him frankly that this is in fact what we are asking. In consequence we may be faced with a request for military conversations, but a mission could then be sent to Ankara without weakening our position, for there may be military questions connected with later developments in our strategy which could then usefully be discussed with the Turks. The effect on the Germans of our demand for the severance of economic and diplomatic relations, coupled with the presence of a military mission might be extremely satisfactory.