Office of the Historian

740.00112 European War 1939/10775: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

Ankara, May 13, 1944—midnight.
[Received May 14—10:35 a.m.]

864. My 856, May 12, and Department’s 397, May 5. Joint recommendations of my British colleague and myself are as follows: [Page 843]

1.
In our joint view governing factors in this problem are:
(a)
Turk-Hungarian agreement is hard to reconcile with assurance in Turk note of April 17 and establishes a precedent for similar agreements Rumania and Germany.
(b)
Application of blockade originally threatened in our note of April 14 and therefore before chrome decision would have adverse political repercussions and might also react against ourselves, e.g., by giving Turks loophole for more extensive agreement with Axis including perhaps chrome in return for goods cut off by us such as petroleum products. Moreover, we must recognize in final analysis blockade weapon is far less effective in dealing with Turks than with Spaniards or Swiss.
(c)
The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Ambassador Steinhardt on May 12 that he is prepared to sign forthwith an agreement with United Kingdom and United States engaging Turkey to reduce by 40% immediately and unconditionally exports to Axis of the strategic materials listed in our notes of April 14 and in response to the remaining 60% which are to be distributed on a monthly basis to submit to United States and United Kingdom Embassies through this bureau all orders to Axis for essential commodities which would involve strategic exports as counter-value. Under this agreement we should be sure of a 40% reduction of 1943 exports and a further reduction corresponding to our ability to replace Axis supplies of essential goods.
(d)
We have Minister for Foreign Affairs’ past record and can assume that he is out to give away as little as possible. We should if possible avoid doing battle on ground of his choosing and in particular should not be drawn into statistical discussions [which?] would give him opportunity for procrastination and bargaining.
(e)
Time factor is of paramount importance, first, to make Turks understand we are in earnest, secondly, to prevent renewal of Clodius and other Axis agreements, and thirdly, to stop at earliest possible moment present outflow of strategic commodities to Axis Europe.
2.
With above considerations in mind my British colleague and I recommend that we be immediately authorized to take following action:
(a)
Lodge a protest formally and strongly against terms of Turko-Hungarian agreement which so flagrantly ignore wishes of British and American Governments as expressed in their notes of April 14 and seem contrary to assurances contained in Turk reply of April 17.
(b)
Take note of the valuable contribution which the Turk Government has made to the Allied cause by their chrome decision.
(c)
Point out that even so and in spite of Numan’s oral explanations of his intentions regarding execution of Turko-Hungarian agreements, two Governments must ask to have position clearly stated so as to avoid possibility of further misunderstanding.
(d)
Request a formal written assurance from the Turk Government that under the recently concluded Turko-Hungarian agreement the export of strategic commodities as defined in our notes of April 14 shall in no case exceed 50% of the quantities exported to Hungary in 1943 and that the remaining 50% shall be reduced by any quantities [Page 844] representing the counter-value of goods covered by the agreement which after consultation can be made available from Allied sources.
(e)
Request a further written undertaking that in the event of the conclusion or renewal of any further agreement with Germany or Axis countries involving the strategic commodities, Turkey’s contractual obligations to export these commodities will in no case exceed 50% of the deliveries of these commodities made by her to that country in 1943 and that the remaining 50% shall be reduced by any quantity representing the counter-value of goods which after consultation the Allied powers would provide.
(f)
The British and American Governments offer to undertake to do their utmost within their material possibilities and in full consultation with the appropriate Turkish authorities to supply Turkey’s essential needs. With this end in view they would immediately remove all export bans and be ready to enter into immediate discussions with the Turkish Government with a view to programming the supply to Turkey of her essential needs. In this connection stress might be laid on their realization of the necessity of providing such commodities as anti-malarial and other drugs, raw wool, cotton piece good yarns, load carrying vehicles, tires, agricultural machines et cetera.
(g)
It might be desirable to indicate that the two Governments would be prepared to discuss the development of their purchasing program in Turkey with a view to cushioning the effect of the cessation of Turkish exports to the Axis.
3.
As has been stressed above speed was more essential factor and though we do not suggest that the above course of action is perfect or that if successful it would give us 100% satisfaction we feel that it is most important that we should act at once in anticipation of German moves retaining the initiative and set ourselves to obtain a result which combined with the chrome embargo would give us in practice a much greater measure of satisfaction than could have been hoped for a month ago. Early public knowledge of the conclusion of such an agreement would undoubtedly be of assistance to the Department in its dealings with other neutrals. The alternative in our view is prolonged discussion of detail, the loss of initiative and of present favorable tide and a continued flow to the Axis of strategic materials at a decisive period of the war.

A similar telegram has been sent to London by my British colleague.

Steinhardt