890E.00/10–2044: Telegram
The Appointed Minister to Syria and Lebanon ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 21—3:43 p.m.]
228. Last week saw important new developments in Levant political situation following return of Syrian and Lebanese delegations from Alexandria Conference.74
[Page 804]On October 13 Beynet called on Lebanese President who immediately thereafter sent for Spears. Latter’s report to London recounted: 1, that Beynet said conference resolutions made Franco-Lebanese treaty impossible and French Government might therefore consider Catroux’s declarations of Lebanese independence invalidated; and 2, that President replied such interpretation was nonsense and independence was established fact which could not be abolished.
On 14th, Secretary of British Legation obtained from Ostrorog confirmation of French position as follows: Catroux declaration provided for treaty; since this was no longer possible (for idea of submitting it to Iraq, for example, was ludicrous) Alexandria resolutions had in effect impaired independence of Levant States as defined in such declaration.
Ostrorog added under questioning that Beynet had not acted under instructions. My personal reaction to this was that for him to take so important a step without specific directive seemed incongruous.
Syrian President and Foreign Minister Mardam with whom I discussed matter on 16th pressed [expressed] serious concern, later elaborated by Mardam. The situation he says seems to be developing along lines disturbingly similar to those preceding November 1943 crisis; it was striking that now as then French pressure is exerted primarily on Lebanon; he had had two half hour talks with Beynet since démarche to Lebanese President without mention being made thereof.
On 18th Lebanese Foreign Minister Tacla gave me following version of French démarche: Beynet said he was disturbed—and from his telegrams his Government seemed troubled—by Conference resolutions; personally he thought Paris might be led to reconsider the Catroux accords.
Tacla too expressed grave concern especially as the démarche followed so closely French Ministerial Council decision of October 6 (published in Egyptian press but stopped by local British military censor) refusing to transfer Troupes Spéciales. Spears has shown me British Foreign Office telegram to Paris protesting strongly against this decision.
Tacla also, as another important indication of French policy, [apparent omission] a démarche made by Ostrorog in two recent conversations with Maronite Patriarch. On first visit he left copy of Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement and on second he proposed signature of appeal to Beynet for continuing French protection of Maronites and all Oriental Christians. Patriarch refused.
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It was in this troubled atmosphere that on October 16 I presented note outlined in 176 October 7, 8 p.m. during call on Mardam at his invitation. Spears had presented Eden’s reply earlier same morning [Page 805] and I did not receive until that evening your 188 October 14, 6 p.m. suggesting delay. I communicated at same time the Franco-American exchange of memoranda enclosed with Department’s instruction 234 of October 6.76
Actually the timing was satisfyingly effective and Mardam arranged that I discuss situation with President Kuwatly same afternoon. They commented with obvious sincerity that my communications had been as encouraging as Spears’ had been disturbing.
I found no difficulty in asking whether they believed more favorable terms might be obtained now than later, for Spears had emphasized Eden’s suggestion in that sense. President replied, “Do you mean now while the British Army is still here, for if you do the answer is no, because when later British Army does go what will then prevent French from returning and insisting on more? They can always invent a pretext.”
I then told him of my conversation with Umari which had included suggestion that Lebanon and Syria might propose similar treaties to Britain, Russia, United States and France latter to be supplemented by accords dealing with specific French interests.
President replied he would gladly propose treaties to first three powers but not with France until Troupes Spéciales had been transferred and he had a recognized constituted government to deal with. Spears tells me President also insists that French undertake not to increase their Levant military strength now or later.
In conclusion President implied clearly he did not believe British really wanted him to conclude treaty with France. I have gathered same impression in high British Army circles.