890E:01/9–2844
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)
| Participants: | Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. Murray | |
| Mr. Alling | |
| Mr. Kohler |
Mr. Wright called and presented the attached Aide-Mémoire dated September 28, 1944,53 in response to Mr. Murray’s request of September 22, 1944, for information as to the present British policy toward Syria and Lebanon in the light of the reported recommendation of the British Minister at Beirut to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that they consent to negotiate treaties with the French regulating their respective relations.
Mr. Wright read a telegram which the Foreign Office had just sent to General Spears instructing him not to press the question further [Page 792] at present in view of the strong negative reaction of the Syrian and Lebanese authorities. The Foreign Office explained, however, that it had not envisaged treaties which would be unduly onerous on the Levant Republics or derogatory to their independence but rather a normal regularization of the status of the States and termination of the mandate on the lines of the Iraqi precedent. (Mr. Wright has since supplied the text of this telegram, copy attached.54)
In the ensuing discussion, Mr. Wright said that the British could not be expected to remain in the Levant States indefinitely to provide a counter-weight which the local authorities could use against the French and expressed the opinion that France was rapidly becoming stronger and that Syria and Lebanon might not be able to obtain later the same favorable terms they could expect at present.
Mr. Wright was asked to explain the meaning which the British attached to their recognition of a “predominant position” for France among European powers in the Levant States, and particularly whether they considered that there was any conflict between their use of the word “predominant and privileged” as the equivalent thereof.
Speaking personally but as an official who had been closely associated with the problem, Mr. Wright said the British purpose had been to calm the French apprehensions, rampant at the time of the invasion of the Levant States in 1941,55 that the British intended to supplant the French in that territory; and that the British meant simply that they were prepared to see the French have relations with the Levant States similar to British relations with Iraq. He emphasized that the British concession to the French was limited to “predominance among European States” and that it was specifically stated that this predominance should not prejudice the independence of Syria and Lebanon. He thought that the de Gaulle–Lyttleton exchange had been done in something of a hurry to calm the French; that the British had not taken issue with the phraseology used by General de Gaulle at the time and that it had just not been specifically clarified since.
Asked whether Russia was included among the “European nations” in reference, Mr. Wright replied that no one was thinking about Russia in that area then.
As to the proposed treaty between France and the Levant States, Mr. Wright agreed with Mr. Murray that the case was not exactly parallel to that of Britain in Iraq or Egypt, as the French were not in a position to offer the usual quid pro quo of military security and protection in return for the rights and privileges obtained.
- Infra. ↩
- Not printed.↩
- For correspondence relating to the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by Free French and British forces in 1941, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 725 ff.↩