890E.01/9–1944: Telegram
The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 20—3:45 p.m.]
193. At official reception in Damascus yesterday morning President expressed special satisfaction that Syria and Lebanon had been invited to send delegates to Civil Aviation Conference, readily agreed to await your pleasure in matter of publication of exchange of notes regarding recognition and said I would receive shortly formal communication regarding British proposal reported in my 190, September 15, 6 p.m., that Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties be negotiated.
Lunch for Diplomatic Corps followed after which President retained me for hour’s talk, Premier and Foreign Minister participating. They confirmed reaction reported in my telegram under reference with emphasis on following:
Syria wishes treaties of friendship with all countries, a treaty of special privilege with none; it cannot believe that application of Atlantic Charter principles would permit it to be made victim of new Anglo-French entente.
It wishes to contribute in any possible manner to common victory over Japan as well as Germany; it willingly offers its territory as half-way training area for Allied troops moved from European to Far Eastern theater of operations; and its vital interests demand that Lebanon take similar stand; were such not taken Lebanon’s predominantly [Page 781] Moslem provinces would elect to return to Syria; but this would leave small predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon which would in all probability seek and receive French protection, a development which would constitute continuing threat to peace of Syria and of Arab world.
President then said he was drafting special appeal to President Roosevelt which he would ask me to transmit by airmail pouch.30 I replied that I would be glad to do so.
Finally President said he wished especially to tell me they had decided to ask American Government to assist in choice of eminent American technical advisors for agriculture and irrigation and of a gendarmerie mission, principal task of which would be reorganization of existing service with emphasis on training of officers; his Foreign Minister would prepare formal written request. I answered that I should be happy so to inform you and felt certain request would receive sympathetic consideration soon as lessening of present overriding war needs might permit release of fully competent personnel.
Premier then reverting to British démarche, I was pressed to answer two questions: What kind of a treaty did I think British wanted them to negotiate and what did I personally think of démarche?
First question was particularly interesting for it had been only through questioning that I had in my reported conversation with Spears been able to pin him down to admission that British Foreign Office envisaged treaty of special relations. I replied that, as Spears had told us there was no basic change in British policy, as Churchill31 himself had defined that policy to be that France achieve in Syria and Lebanon a position similar to that of Britain in Egypt and Iraq, and as such British position was based on treaties of alliance, it seemed only reasonable to conclude that similar Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties were envisaged.
In answer to second question I admitted that I too was troubled. They had, I recalled, referred to Atlantic Charter; might I begin with United Nations pact;32 put very simply it bound signatories to wage common war, make common peace and observe principles of Charter; I was troubled both because I sensed that this British démarche might have disturbing repercussions on orderly progress of Middle East political relationships and because it might mean that Britain had reaffirmed a commitment perhaps not illogical when given [Page 782] de Gaulle in 194133 but which, nevertheless, if in fact reaffirmed in changed conditions of today, might tie its hands when moving to negotiate such common peace.
With both my answers they seemed in full accord. I trust you will approve. To have spoken with less frankness would I felt have led them to question the consistency and bona fides of our own declared policy.
This morning Beynet34 called in [on] President to propose opening of treaty negotiations. Reply was firm, polite refusal; details by later telegram.35
Repeated to Caserta.
- Despatch 525 September 22, from Beirut, p. 787.↩
- Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.↩
- The United Nations Declaration, signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. i, p. 25.↩
- On August 7, 1941, an agreement defining relations in Syria and Lebanon between Britain and the National Committee of the Free French at London was accomplished by an exchange of letters between Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the National Committee, and Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East; see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): Statements of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June–9th September, 1941, pp. 3–4. For correspondence relating to the interest of the United States in the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iii, pp. 725 ff.↩
- Gen. Paul E. Beynet, French Delegate General in Syria and Lebanon.↩
- Telegram 194, September 20, 11 a.m., p. 783.↩