890E.01/9–1544: Telegram
The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Beirut (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16—1:15 p.m.]
190. During last week, following return to Beirut of Spears13 and Holmes,14 there has arisen in these countries a situation which in my view warrants your careful consideration.
Spears tells me that recent Anglo-French conversations in London resulted in his receiving categoric instructions from Foreign Office to inform Syrian and Lebanese Governments immediately on his return that British Government would favor conclusion of treaties between them and the French; were they to counter that the de Gaullist regime15 does not possess capacity to conclude treaties he was to say that while there was force in such argument it was his Government’s view that negotiations might well be undertaken and agreements initialed.
He was to explain that, with approaching end of war in Europe, British Government felt it highly desirable that position in Levant States should be “finalized”, that normal method of ending mandate was through treaty and that it would be of advantage to local governments to know exactly where they stood with the French—in short, that Foreign Office had felt that time had come “to get things ironed out”, that there was “no other way out, no other evolution but a treaty”.
Spears commented that Foreign Office view that in all this there was no change in policy but only change of emphasis; previously London had favored conclusion of Franco-Levant treaties but “rather as a pious hope” whereas today it urges their early conclusion.
He added “the French have gained a very great deal”; previously London was prepared to accept treaty relations acknowledging privileged position to France and to say so publicly at any moment agreeable to the three parties (Syria, Lebanon and France) whereas now the French have obtained Foreign Office agreement to make such statement “at a propitious moment” without concurrence of Levant Governments; even now Eden16 might well say in House of Commons “we are very much in favor of treaty”.
[Page 778]Spears then said he had carried out his instructions to the letter. He had talked at length with Lebanese Foreign Minister, briefly with Premier,17 and he had twice met with Syrian President, first alone and then with his Premier18 and Foreign Minister. Lebanese Foreign Minister he recounted had shown “calm wisdom” but firm opposition, saying: “You are asking us to commit suicide; not so long ago you set up an independent Lebanon; now you suggest action which would lead inevitably to its destruction”. Premier was outraged. Both stressed that no Moslem and only portion of Catholic Christian Lebanese would accept treaty and that for Government even to negotiate would cause bitter schism between communities19 and lead to breakup of country, with predominantly Moslem provinces joining Syria.
Syrian reaction had been even stronger. At our first meeting, Spears said, the President was appalled, “a veil fell between us”; he feared coercion and asserted Syria would never sign with France any treaty it would not willingly conclude with other countries as well; at end of last war French were imposed on Syria, “Emir Faisal’s20 only roots were the four legs of his chair whereas mine are deep and the whole country is behind me”.
At second meeting, Spears continued, Syrian Foreign Minister termed as farcical any idea that French mandates should be converted into French protectorate; was not France unable to protect itself? And Premier was forcefully indignant: Britain had only begun to gain Arab confidence; this would end any hopes therefor; Syria “would knock at every door” for help; wires would go to King George,21 President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin;22 special appeal to its Arab neighbors and Jinnah23 in India would not be forgotten.
Spears, I gathered, had only avoided further incensed comment by suggesting, rather to gain time than because it might appease, that Lord Moyne24 was expected to visit him shortly when further discussion of problem might be had.
This morning I called on Lebanese Foreign Minister to deliver invitation to International Civil Air Conference25 (circular Deptel September 11 to Cairo26). He was forthrightly pleased to receive [Page 779] this first invitation that Lebanon participate on a basis of sovereign equality with United Nations at a conference designed to lay one of foundation stones for post-war world.
He confirmed to me, substantially in Spear’s words, his Government’s reactions to Spear’s representations; “For Lebanon to tie its future to that of France at this time would be to commit suicide”, internal crisis would develop and Lebanon would lose friendship of Arab States with whose representatives he is to meet at Arab Unity Congress in Cairo 10 days hence;27 Lebanon asks today that France be not permitted to impose by intrigue or force of arms any special or privileged relationship.
He confirmed, too, much of what Spears had told me of Syrian Government reaction, for he had talked yesterday with Syrian Foreign Minister. They had agreed to answer unequivocally that they would not enter into any treaty negotiations with the French, not even for a commercial convention. He concluded: “Our intention is to await end of war and then to conform our treaty relationships to the international situation; and in such relationships, we like to believe that the principles of the Atlantic Charter28 will be applied”. Two other comments perhaps bear quoting: The first from the Syrian President “I would rather make of Syria a Soviet Republic”, and the other from my Iraqi colleague “We will help, even with our army.”
From influential Lebanese Moslem political leader Karami also I have confirmation of this official reaction. Immediately following Spear’s visit, he was called to confer with Syrian President, first alone and then with two Premiers. All were strongly indignant, et cetera, as above, and President concluded, “If necessary we shall stand up and fight”.
However, Karami concluded calmer councils prevailed, especially in light of a remark by Spears (to which he made no reference in talk with me) to effect that “should there occur again an incident similar to that of last November I am sorry to say we shall not be able to take a stand similar to that then taken”.29
I shall visit Damascus this weekend and report further. I believe that the two Governments will limit current action to formal communications to Spears of their categoric refusal to negotiate with the French and that they will then solicit all possible foreign support of their stand.
Repeated to Caserta.
- Sir Edward L. Spears, British Minister to Syria and Lebanon.↩
- Gen. Sir William G. Holmes, General Officer Commanding the British Ninth Army in Syria.↩
- The French Committee of National Liberation under the Presidency of Gen. Charles de Gaulle. In June 1944, the Committee proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of the French Republic. The United States recognized the Provisional Government on October 23, 1944.↩
- Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Riad as-Solh.↩
- Saadallah Jabri.↩
- i.e., the various religious denominations.↩
- Faisal I, first King of Iraq (1921–1933) and a leader of the Arab Revolt in the First World War. He was proclaimed King of Greater Syria in March 1920 by the Syrian National Congress and deposed by the French in July 1920.↩
- King George VI of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.↩
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩
- Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of the All-India Moslem League.↩
- British Minister Resident in the Middle East.↩
- For correspondence relating to the International Civil Aviation Conference, see vol. ii , index entry under Civil Aviation Conference.↩
- Not printed.↩
- See bracketed note. p. 660.↩
- Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- For correspondence concerning the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943, see ibid., 1943, vol. iv, pp. 996 ff.↩