890F.50/9–744
The Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 13.]
Sir: Yesterday I had a long conference with Shaikh Yussuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister and Private Secretary to King Abdul Aziz al Saud, who had just returned from several days at Taif where he received from Amir Faisal personally special communications from the King. Shaikh Yussuf said he wanted to speak with me on a subject of the greatest importance, in the strictest confidence, not about the details of the current supply program now under reconsideration, but regarding the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and America in the years to come. His remarks are summarized as follows:
- 1.
- The King is convinced of the personal friendship of President Roosevelt, which he reciprocates. From experience he has a high regard for the Americans who have come to Saudi Arabia, for their good works and their good will. He is persuaded that the new American Minister to Saudi Arabia has Arabian welfare close to his heart.
- 2.
- On the other hand, recent events give no assurance that these auspices will fulfill our mutual hopes. When His Majesty was informed last spring that the American Government was prepared to extend aid to Saudi Arabia, up to the amount to be given by the British, it was assumed that the country would benefit from this generous intervention. Instead, the combined supply and financial aid is less than that received from the British in 1943 in supplies alone, besides which the British financial subsidy was also cut off. [Page 735] The net result of America’s offer, therefore, is that Britain is relieved of half of her already reduced obligations, without any benefit whatsoever to Arabia. It matters not that this may be called a misunderstanding of the American offer, which has no doubt been fulfilled to the letter, but the disappointment is there and the failure to get any benefit from America’s participation is also there. If the American participation prevents benefit to Saudi Arabia, then Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia is Lend-Lease to Britain alone.
- 3.
- When the King sees the great nation of America content to have its economic activity in Arabia reduced and defined by its ally, Britain, America in turn will surely understand that Saudi Arabia may be excused if it yields to the same constraint from the same source, not merely to please an ally, but to survive. Without arms or resources, Saudi Arabia must not reject the hand that measures its food and drink.
- 4.
- Unwilling as he is to entertain the thought, the King cannot but consider the possibility that America may lose interest in his distant land, after the war, as she has retired to domestic preoccupations after other wars. Even more to be dreaded is the possibility that America might permit her policy to be dictated by influential pressure groups, which have already spoken through the party platforms to foreshadow a possible “MESC” (political of course) for Palestine, wherein America’s generous intentions may be compressed and diverted into a policy beneficial to someone no doubt, but not to the Arabs.
- 5.
- The Saudi Arabian Government therefore inquires whether there is an exit for our two nations from this confinement. It is understood that neither wishes a break of confidence or of cooperation with the British. It is not suggested that the joint program be broken off. The question is whether over and above the MESC program and limitations there is not some large area in which Saudi Arabia and America can collaborate alone, on a basis that leads far beyond the end of the war. Only thus can our combined effort assure continuity, stability, and mutual benefit. With the European war nearing its glorious end, the question is urgent.
I made little comment during the above, interrupting only to ask Shaikh Yussuf to repeat and clarify his remarks from time to time. I am convinced that he was transmitting a point of view which is basic to our future interests in Saudi Arabia.
More he would not say on behalf of the King. When I asked him to suggest ways and means, he was very reluctant to do so. In reply to statements made by me, I found that he understands perfectly that under American law our government cannot grant financial subsidies, but he expressed the conviction that loans could be made, directly or indirectly. He pointed out that America had already offered to help by selling gold and silver bullion to Saudi Arabia, and that they would take advantage of this offer gratefully. However, the sums they can secure by advance royalties from Aramco are small, too small to meet the point under discussion whereby a substantial development of [Page 736] Saudi Arabian economy could be undertaken with American cooperation.
Insisting again that he was speaking only for himself, he hinted at possible American interest in aviation, military and commercial, citing the recent request of the U.S. Army for a direct route across northern Arabia (Legation’s telegram 265 September 4, 9 a.m.,47 and despatch No. 1 of September 448). I asked him whether he had in mind a treaty whereby the United States would have all aviation rights in Saudi Arabia, or only a concession to commercial aviation. He said a proposal, if any, should come from the United States, not from Saudi Arabia, and if made he hoped it would be for not less than twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five. I got the distinct impression that the King would be hospitable to a treaty for American aviation rights if thereby he could secure financial resources soon. Shaikh Yussuf pointed out that the patrolling and protecting of our oil concession, refineries, and possible pipe-lines should justify investment by the American Government.
I thanked Shaikh Yussuf for what he had said in confidence, and assured him that I would be glad to study with him in the weeks to come, ways and means whereby our two Governments might promote economic cooperation in Saudi Arabia outside the MESC supplies.
Respectfully yours,