761.91/11–2444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling)89
Michael Wright of the British Embassy called yesterday to review the various steps which have been taken in regard to Soviet pressure on Iran. On November 18 Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador at Moscow, reported in reply to inquiry from the Foreign Office that he believed that some kind of reiteration of the British position would be desirable in order to check the headlong progress of the Soviet policy in Iran. However, Clark Kerr said that he doubted the wisdom of asking Molotov the meaning of Soviet activities. He felt that any such query during a visit to Molotov would bring nothing but denials and prevarications. At the same time Clark Kerr thought it would be well to let Molotov know that the British had an eye on him, and he therefore proposed that something be said in writing. He was inclined to believe that an intimation might be given in such a communication that if the Iranian question was not settled soon it would obviously have to come up at the next meeting of the Big Three.
London’s reply to the foregoing message was that if Clark Kerr felt it would be better to write rather than to speak to Molotov, that was quite acceptable. However, the Foreign Office did not feel that it was desirable at the present juncture to suggest the possibility of the Iranian situation being brought to the attention of the President, the Prime Minister, and Marshal Stalin. The Foreign Office explained that it took this viewpoint partly because consultation with the United States would be necessary before any such statement as Clark Kerr proposed could be made to Molotov.
On the same day, November 20, the Foreign Office telegraphed to Tehran, urging the Ambassador there to do all he could to keep the Iranians “in heart”. On the same day a second telegram was sent to Tehran agreeing with the Ambassador’s views that the effect would be bad if it became clear that the Russian methods had succeeded in accomplishing their purpose. The hope was expressed therefore, that the Embassy would do its utmost to see that the new Prime Minister followed Saed’s policy.
I told Mr. Wright that the foregoing had been my understanding of the situation, although I believed some of our people gained the impression that the British Ambassador in Moscow was not in favor of making any communication to the Soviet Government. I told Mr. Wright [Page 477] that the present situation, so far as we were concerned, was that we proposed to wait until we had heard from Mr. Harriman who was planning to stop off in Tehran en route to his post at Moscow. Mr. Wright said he agreed that it was important not to give the Russians the impression that the British and Americans were “ganging up” on them. At the same time he felt it was equally important to avoid the impression that one Government was taking a greater interest in the Iranian problem than the other. I told Mr. Wright it seemed to me there was some advantage in spacing our respective representations so as to make clear that there was a continuing interest on the part of both of us.
- Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray), the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen), and Mr. Harold B. Minor of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs.↩