891.6363/11–2044: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 20—5:45 p.m.]
4438. ReDepts 2566, October 30, 10 p.m. I called on the British Ambassador88 at his suggestion on November 18 and he showed me instructions he had from Eden requesting him to take up with Molotov the questions raised in the British note of November 2 with respect to Soviet action in Iran which was along lines somewhat similar to ours. It was proposed to him in these instructions that he ask Molotov for an explanation of Soviet policy in the light of what had occurred since that time. He had decided to reply to his Government stating that he thought it would be unwise to approach Molotov with such a request, that it might only cause the Russians to dig their toes in just at a moment when it looked as though there might be a possibility of their shifting ground. He asked me whether he might say that I agreed with this view.
I told him that I agreed with him that it would probably serve no useful purpose to ask Molotov for an explanation of Soviet policy as this would presumably only elicit the usual recitation of the Soviet position as we know it from the press. I had no objection to his saying that I associated myself with his recommendation although I was not optimistic as to the permanency of any Russian shifting of ground. I repeated to him in this connection the views which I set forth to the Department in my 4266, November 7, 7 p.m. I told him that I could think of no action on our part which would tend to apply the brakes to Soviet action in Iran except possibly an intimation that this subject [Page 475] might or might not—depending on Soviet action in the meantime—have to come up for discussion in the light of the Tehran Declaration at the next meeting of Marshal Stalin with the President and Prime Minister Churchill whenever that might take place. I believe the British Ambassador incorporated this thought into his telegram.
I think I made it clear to the British Ambassador that I do not mean by this to suggest that the subject should be made in any way a formal matter of agenda for any future meetings. I did mean that the only thing I could think of which might serve to deter the Russians from projecting further their present line of action in Iran would be the thought that if they went too far they might have to explain such action in the light of the Tehran Declaration when another meeting occurs. Whether it is desirable from the broader standpoint of policy that such a thought should be intimated to them at this time is another question the merits of which could be appraised only in Washington.
- Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.↩