Office of the Historian

891.6363/11–744: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 7, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received November 8—6:39 a.m.]

4266. No specific background is available here on Soviet action in northern Iran other than what has been reported in the press. Judging from this and from the general pattern of Soviet methods and reactions the following thoughts suggest themselves.

1.
The basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for the oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled with the concern for prestige which marks all Soviet policy these days. The oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil centers which so closely escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there. It probably sees no other way to assure this than by seeking greater political and economic control for itself and finds this aim consistent with contemporary Soviet conceptions of prestige. If the methods employed in this connection seem unimaginative and old-fashioned it must be remembered that there is extensive preoccupation in Moscow today with the methods as well as the aims of Tsarist diplomacy.
2.
The Russians may think that we are opposing their political program in northern Iran. They may even suspect that with this in mind we have hinted to the Iranians we would rather forego concessions ourself than see the Russians get them. Viewed against this background our note to the Iranian Government could appear to them a clever and effective move on the chess board.
3.
Unable to proceed in pressing for oil concessions without risk of drawing us still further into the picture and of attracting unfavorable publicity, Moscow may well now drop the oil issue and the policy of intimidation for the time being and set about to undermine those [Page 471] individuals, particularly Saed, who are considered to have loaned themselves to the creation of this set of circumstances. If this course should be adopted the oil question would then probably be held in abeyance until conditions were more auspicious.
4.
Too much importance should not be attached to Kavtaradze’s personal role. It is not likely that he took any important step except on Moscow’s instructions. If there has been any question of his prestige it is because the Soviet Government saw its own prestige involved in his rank and position. The fact that he was granted the Order of Lenin 3 or 4 days ago hardly indicates he is being blamed for anything in connection with his present mission.
5.
Among foreign observers here the most charitable interpretation of Izvestia’s unenthusiastic reference to American forces in Iran is that it was designed to make Soviet action look relatively legitimate. The more critical view associates it with the prospects for early opening of the Black Sea route for supplies to Russia.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Tehran as No. 69.

Kennan