761.91/12–1144: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:11 p.m.]
4771. Ambassador Morris has comprehensively reported in his telegram to the Department of December 6 repeated to Moscow as No. 105 [107?]6 on his audience with the Shah. In conveying the President’s greetings to the Shah I spoke of the President’s personal interest in Iran enhanced by the information and understanding he had obtained at first hand during his visit a year ago. The Shah spoke frankly and directly regarding his concern over the recent attitude and actions of the Soviet Government in connection with the oil concession. I pointed out that the declaration on Iran was of course the accepted policy of our Government and that I was [Page 355] authorized to call to the attention of the Soviet Government my Government’s views on any action which it was felt might be inconsistent with the declaration. On the other hand I emphasized that it was the Iranian Government’s responsibility to work out its relationship directly with the Soviet Government. The Shah stated he believed the Soviets would continue to attempt to stimulate agitation in the north against him and his Government and that the best way to counteract this influence was for his Government to develop a forward social and economic policy. In this policy he hoped for American assistance not only in furnishing advisers to his Government but in a practical way as well. I was impressed by his intelligent grasp of the problems of Iran but could not help wonder whether Iranian political leaders have the ability and integrity to carry through such a policy.
In the talk Ambassador Morris and I had with Maximov, reported in Tehran’s telegram to the Department No. 907, December 6,7 the latter made it very plain that he had no intention of letting matters drop but intended to take aggressive measures to attain the Soviet objectives which appear to be much more far-reaching than simply the oil and mineral concession and to include the upsetting of the Government which he characterized as representing only 5% of the Iranian population. Maximov expounded the extraordinary thesis that, since the Iranian Government did not truly represent the Iranian people and since the Soviets knew what the Iranian people wanted, it was proper for the Soviet Government to see that this opinion found political expression. Although there appears to be no action called for by us at this time, I feel that the Shah’s fears have basis and that the situation should be watched carefully.
Sent to Department as 4771 and repeated to London as 302, Tehran as 108, Cairo as 23 and to Baghdad.