711.91/7–1244: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ford)
462. Your 494 July 12. Dept recognizes the increasing importance of American relations with Iran and is prepared to assume a more active and positive role in Iranian affairs than was possible or necessary in the prewar period. While our position in Iran prior to the war was relatively unimportant except in a cultural sense and while [Page 344] our present accelerated interest there derives to a great extent from war exigencies, there are important reasons why our present heightened interests in Iran should be extended into the postwar period. These may be grouped into the following three categories: (1) General motives. Iran having turned to us for assistance, we are obliged, in accord with the policy of this Government, to render unselfishly such aid as we may. This help comprises such technical advice and economic assistance as may be possible within the limits imposed at present by the war effort. The President and Dept have considered Iran as something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for the good faith of the United Nations. (2) Practical international considerations. From a purely practical international viewpoint a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal weaknesses and dissensions which breed foreign intervention, would contribute toward building a healthy international body politic and establishing a lasting peace. A weak Iran would create an incipient condition in which future wars might germinate. (3) Protection and furtherance of national interests. This includes the possibility of sharing more fully in Iran’s commerce and in the development of its resources; the strategic location of Iran for civil air bases;86 and the growing importance of Iranian and Arabian oil fields.
Numerous recent attitudes and actions of Dept reflect the increasingly active policy we are following with regard to Iran. These include: (1) Support of the American adviser program. (2) Close interest in the present negotiations for a petroleum concession in Iran. (3) Expression of interest in postwar civil air bases in Iran. (4) Raising of the Legation in Tehran to an Embassy87 and strengthening of the staff. (5) Dept’s initiative in suggesting and pressing the British-Russian-American diplomatic conversations now taking place in Tehran. (6) The leading part played by the President in the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943. (7) The conversations with War which resulted in the broadening of General Connolly’s directives and permitted our military forces in Iran to give concrete aid to the Iranian Government.
In the development of this policy, stress has been laid on the aspect of assisting the Iranians, at their own request, to build up a strong and independent national entity, free from foreign domination and from internal dissension. The impression should be avoided at all costs that we intend to stand at the side of Iran as a political buffer to restrain our Allies the British and Russians with regard to Iran. We should emphasize rather the importance to the world of a strong and [Page 345] independent Iran as a member of the community of nations and should seek the support and sympathy of our Allies in achieving this end. We should avoid any unilateral commitment to Iran which would promise or intimate the use of force.
With the above objectives and considerations clearly in mind, the implementation of this policy should be positive but flexible. The Department is persuaded of the present usefulness of the adviser program and is prepared to support it strongly within the limits already indicated. These are briefly that we have no intention of imposing any adviser or group of advisers on the Iranians but must expect the Iranian Government to accord any advisers retained the support and protection necessary to permit the creation of an atmosphere in which they will have a chance successfully to accomplish their tasks. However, the adviser program is only one manifestation of this policy and its discontinuance should not alter our basic policy of strengthening Iran by other feasible means.
In the furtherance of this basic policy we should obtain the understanding and active cooperation of all agencies of the United States Government. Americans in Iran should be made aware of the policy and conscious of their part in the implementation. The Ambassador should coordinate all American civilian activities in Iran, maintaining close and effective liaison with the American military authorities, directing and controlling the various American civilian agencies operating in the country and exercising such supervision over the advisers as would not be inconsistent with their status as Iranian employees. The Department will emphasize among the U.S. agencies represented in Iran the great importance of all American officials and individuals in Iran working together as a team, under the Ambassador’s direction, to implement this Government’s policy towards Iran.
In summary, the response to the important query posed by urtel under reference is that America’s position in Iran is not intended to lapse again in any way to that of relative unimportance. An active policy of strengthening Iran and of protecting American interests against any discrimination will be followed. Every effort will be made to obtain British and Russian collaboration. At the same time no implication of the use of armed force to maintain Iran’s independence will be given.
A paraphrase of this telegram is being furnished the Secretary of War under cover of a letter88 from the Secretary requesting the earnest cooperation of War in carrying out this policy.