891.00/3043: Telegram
The Chargé in Iran (Ford) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 6—3:18 p.m.]
315. This is preliminary report in response to interesting and most promising directive in Department’s telegram No. 266, April 30.
Initial discussions yesterday, first with Maximov, Soviet Chargé, who said he had not yet received instructions from Moscow, and subsequently with Bullard, who said he had received instructions from London. I endeavored to keep conversation to generalities, with central theme being my Government’s keen interest in seeing American adviser program made successful not only for Iran’s present economic betterment but also for possible future guidance when and if the three Allies are called upon elsewhere to cooperate in helping to rehabilitate small nations. I expressed the hope that, in subsequent conversations we may hold together, this immediate as well as long-range basis for cooperation in Iran may be given primary consideration and that I felt my Government would welcome both suggestions and concrete acts which might tend toward realization of this cooperative ideal and I obviously avoided in these preliminary talks any mention of specific cases.
Maximov, inscrutable, skeptical but withal receptive and friendly, promised to let me know immediately when he heard from Moscow. He asked if I had yet seen Bullard on this matter and I was happily able to say no but I had appointment to see him afternoon. He asked if the discussions had been originated by Iranian Government, and I assured him the suggestion, aimed at implementing Allied economic pledges given at Tehran Conference, had come from my Government. He questioned whether Iran really wanted to be saved and I replied that Iran itself had invited advisers here and was maintaining them at considerable expense and that repeated instances of Soviet and British assistance in transport needs during last harvest had been received gratefully by Iran constituted clear proof that this country did indeed welcome any assistance the Allies individually or cooperatively might give her in helping to maintain her economic stability.
[Page 334]Bullard was equally receptive and promised fullest cooperation in any talks we may have.… He realized necessity for avoiding impression of a British-American front, and expressed pleasure that I had seen Soviets first.
I feel that a tentative agenda for our discussions might well be held in abeyance until I have had further conversation with Maximov based on any instructions he may receive from Moscow. However, I hope Department will agree that, insofar as our participation is concerned, we should stress grave importance we attach to success of adviser program in Iran, and that we hope any action the British and Soviets may take vis-à-vis Iranian economy will have as a criterion whether or not such action will help or hurt our advisers’ chances of success in their efforts to rescue Iran. More specific matters can of course be dealt with under this over-all statement of policy in the manner suggested by the Department, but I feel it is highly desirable, in order to avoid appearance that discussions are aimed at any one power, to base our part of conversations on our expressed determination to support adviser program and to invite and possibly to urge both British and Soviets to join us in that determined support.
I am seeing the Prime Minister70 tomorrow on other matters and should the moment seem propitious shall speak to him informally of proposed discussions. If not, I shall delay until talks have progressed further, and in any event am grateful to Department for its open attitude in this regard. I further hope the excellent directive under acknowledgement will be supplemented by further instructions on this supremely important subject.
- Mohammed Saed, who had formed a Cabinet in succession to the government of Ali Soheily, which had resigned on March 17.↩