740.0011 Stettinius Mission/109
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Murray ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Stettinius )
In the Teheran Declaration of December 1, 1943, signed by Messrs. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, it was agreed that:
“…63 The three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran and they [are] agreed that they will continue to make available to the Iran Government such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.”
While Iran’s economic position is somewhat better than last summer, it is still very precarious and could be vastly improved by closer coordination of Russian, British and American policy in Iran with a view to the implementation of our common pledges of economic assistance. Exactly what action needs to be taken can be best judged by our representatives on the spot. We are therefore proposing that all three Governments should instruct their diplomatic representatives at Teheran to consult together and to exchange information and concert action.
From an American point of view, we are particularly anxious to secure Soviet support of the work of Dr. Millspaugh and the other American advisers to the Iranian Government. We have promoted the American adviser program solely in the interest of stabilizing the [Page 329] general situation in Iran because of that country’s great importance as a transport route to Russia, and the Soviets can be reassured that we have no ulterior motives whatsoever in this connection.
Sir Maurice Peterson, British Under Secretary of State, and I are meeting on Tuesday morning at 10:30 with the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy at London, Mr. Zinchenko, to “break the ice” on this subject prior to the lunch which you and Mr. Eden are having later the same day with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Gousev.
I should add that we are being careful to avoid giving the Soviets any impression that the British and ourselves are “ganging up” on them.
- Omission indicated in the original memorandum.↩