President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)49
673. Personal for the Former Naval Person. I have been as deeply concerned as you have yourself in regard to the tragic difficulties you have encountered in Greece. I appreciate to the full the anxious and difficult alternatives with which you have been faced. I regard my role in this matter as that of a loyal friend and ally whose one desire is to be of any help possible in the circumstances. You may be sure that in putting my thoughts before you I am constantly guided by the fact that nothing can in any way shake the unity and association between our two countries in the great tasks to which we have set our hands.
As anxious as I am to be of the greatest help to you in this trying situation, there are limitations imposed in part by the traditional policies of the United States and in part by the mounting adverse reaction of public opinion in this country. No one will understand better than yourself that I, both personally and as head of State, am necessarily responsive to the state of public feeling. It is for these reasons that it has not been possible for this Government to take a stand along with you in the present course of events in Greece. Even to attempt to do so would bring only temporary value to you and would in the long run do injury to our basic relationships. I don’t need to tell you how much I dislike this state of affairs as between you and me. My one hope is to see it rectified so we can go along in this as in everything, shoulder to shoulder. I know that [Page 151] you, as the one on whom the responsibility rests, desire with all your heart a satisfactory solution of the Greek problem and particularly one that will bring peace to that ravished country. I will be with you wholeheartedly in any solution which takes into consideration the factors I have mentioned above. With this in mind I am giving you at random some thoughts that have come to me in my anxious desire to be of help.
I know that you have sent Macmillan there with broad powers to find such a solution and it may be that he will have been successful before you get this. I of course lack full details and am at a great distance from the scene, but it has seemed to me that a basic reason—or excuse, perhaps—for the EAM attitude has been distrust regarding the intentions of King George. I wonder if Macmillan’s efforts might not be greatly facilitated if the King himself would approve the establishment of a regency in Greece and would make a public declaration of his intention not to return unless called for by popular plebiscite. This might be particularly effective if accompanied by an assurance that elections will be held at some fixed date, no matter how far in the future, when the people would have full opportunity to express themselves.
Meanwhile, might it not be possible to secure general agreement on the disarmament and dissolution of all the armed groups now in the country, including the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion, leaving your troops to preserve law and order alone until the Greek national forces can be reconstituted on a non-partisan basis and adequately equipped.
I shall be turning over in my mind this whole question and hope you will share your thoughts and worries with me.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Draft prepared in the Department of State.↩