892.01/9–544: Airgram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 30—5 p.m.]
A–1085. With reference to the Department’s secret telegram 6486, August 16, 5 p.m., regarding the British attitude towards Thailand, there is given below the text of a secret letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Ambassador15 on this subject:
“I welcome your secret letter of 18th August as giving me the opportunity for a much-needed clearing of the air in regard to our respective attitudes towards Siam.
Frankly we were very disappointed at the reception by the State Department of our honest attempt to show that we were no less favourable than in the United States and China to the idea of a free and independent Siam after the war.16 Nothing could have been more definite in its discouragement of our attempt than the first paragraph of the statement handed to Lord Halifax on 20th March and, incidentally, the remark that our proposed declaration would ‘augment’ distrust of our intentions produced, if I may say so, an unfortunate impression here.
If you will consult the statement of 20th March again I think you will agree that the burden of the criticism was not, as suggested in paragraph 1 of your letter, that our declaration failed to give any intimation that Siam would be continued as an independent Power (a point dealt with in fact in the last sentence of our draft declaration). The criticism appeared to be rather that the declaration did not include an ‘unequivocal commitment’ that Great Britain had no territorial ambitions in Siam, and the suggestion was made that this omission should be remedied in any declaration on our part. This suggestion was an invitation to go further than the United States Government had themselves gone in their proposed declaration, which was silent on the territorial point. Moreover, it implied the existence of a doubt on a matter already covered by this country’s undertakings in the Atlantic Charter17 and the Cairo Declaration.18
I am relieved to see that your present letter offers a different and more hopeful approach to the subject and I am happy to take advantage of it.
Our two Governments have, I think, the same basic objects as regards Siam. We, like the United States, want to see the restoration of Siam after the war as a free, sovereign and independent State, subject only to its acceptance of such special arrangements for security [Page 1317] or economic collaboration as may be judged necessary within an international system. Before this stage is reached we have to drive out the Japanese and to this end we wish, as do the United States, to encourage the Siamese themselves to create the maximum difficulties for the Japanese and thus to make the maximum contribution to their own liberation. But at present we and the United States Government have not got our ideas coordinated and if we are to get this problem straightened out it is essential that we should recognise that we necessarily view it from somewhat different angles. The United States Government do not regard themselves as being at war with Siam. His Majesty’s Government do. Moreover, while appreciating the possible advantages of Siam’s resistance to the Japanese, His Majesty’s Government do not rate its practical value very high and feel that it is in any case of doubtful wisdom to encourage the comfortable view that the Siamese can count on an easy and assured future regardless of their attitude towards the Japanese and the efforts which they make to help themselves and us. We feel, in fact, that if resistance is to be encouraged it may need a spur rather than a sugar-plum.
Again, we are bound to consider the effect upon neighbouring territories of any public declaration about Siam and it is here that any reference to territorial integrity presents difficulties. As declared at Cairo, ‘we have no thought of territorial expansion’, but it goes without saying that Siam cannot be allowed to keep the ill-gotten gains which she has accepted from her Japanese ally at the expense of Malaya, of Burma and of French Indo-China.19 Some special strategic arrangements may also be necessary in the Kra Isthmus within the framework of an international security system. I am glad to note the assurance in your letter that our right to present such problems of territorial security or integrity to the United Nations for consideration would not be prejudiced, so far as the United States Government are concerned, by any undertaking we might now give. But there is a danger that any pronouncement about territorial integrity might create popular misunderstanding unless hedged about with reservations on the particular questions referred to above. A detailed statement on the other hand would be likely to have the undesirable result of encouraging premature discussion of a matter which it is our policy to leave to the peace settlement. Even in the case of Allies we have refrained from any commitment about territorial integrity and I cannot believe that the United States Government would wish to press us to treat an enemy more tenderly than an Ally.
Any formal statement on Siam, whether for publication or otherwise, would require Cabinet approval and the concurrence of the Dominions. But I trust that this personal letter in which I have attempted to make our position quite clear will serve the purpose of removing any uncertainty about our intentions. I need hardly say that I shall welcome further consultation on the whole question.”
- Dated September 4.↩
- For statements by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt on this subject, see telegrams 293, February 27, 1943, from Chungking, and 362, March 17, 1943, to Chungking, Foreign Relations, 1943, China, pp. 13 and 36, respectively.↩
- Joint Statement of August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- Made by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill and released by the White House December 1, 1943; for text, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.↩
- For French Indochina–Thailand border dispute, see indexes in Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. iv, p. 1041, and ibid., vol. v, p. 934; for texts of convention of peace between France and Thailand and its protocol, and French-Japanese and French-Japanese-Thai protocols, all signed at Tokyo May 9, 1941, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, pp. 805, 800, and 802, respectively.↩