Lot 122, Box 53
Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East
(CAC–161a)
Formosa: (Taiwan) Occupation and Military Government Composition of Forces
I. The Problem
The problem is: 1) “If the Island of Formosa (including the Pescadores) is occupied after successful military assault by the sea-borne forces of the United States, is it desirable to invite the Chinese to participate in the administration of civil affairs after the occupation? 2) If the occupation is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, is it desirable that the Chinese Government participate in civil administration? 3) Notwithstanding unofficial Chinese statements that China expects to assume control immediately, will it be understood that transfer of sovereignty will not take place until a final settlement? Is it contemplated that the United States singly or in collaboration with China, will assume major responsibility until such final settlements?” (Questions 4a, 4b and 4c)69
II. Basic Factors
According to the Cairo Declaration, “Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to China”.
However, the present military weakness of China, especially the absence of a navy, makes it almost impossible for China to take the initiative in any campaign to drive the Japanese out of Formosa. On [Page 1270] the other hand, it may be assumed that Pacific operations will include the capture and occupation of Formosa (including the Pescadores) by sea-borne forces of the United States or of the United States and its allies. As these operations would be under the direction of an American theater commander, it is likely that the United States will establish a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa and that the commander of the United States forces in that area will be responsible for the establishment and operation of such an administration and will continue to assume that responsibility until such time as arrangements have been made to reestablish Chinese sovereignty over Formosa. If it seems politically advisable at the time, representation of those combat forces which were not American might be provided for on the civil affairs staff.
As the population of Formosa is predominantly Chinese and as this territory will be returned to China after the war, the Chinese Government’s cooperation would be helpful for the effective functioning of the military administration of civil affairs in Formosa, and would be politically advisable. This administration should be such as to expedite the return of Formosa to China. The Chinese Government should be informed of the general decisions which the Government may reach with respect to the establishment of civil affairs administration under an American commanding officer. It would be advisable to have the American plans for civil affairs in Formosa, so far as military considerations permit, coincide with China’s future plans for the administration of Formosa. It would be helpful if China should make available highly qualified Chinese advisers and persons skilled in financial and legal matters and in agriculture and industry who could assist American civil affairs officers with the formulation of plans for civil administration in Formosa and who could be employed in responsible positions in the island. Chinese personnel with a first-hand knowledge of conditions and of the dialects in Formosa, who could be entrusted with administrative and police functions under the military administration, might be invaluable to the civil affairs authorities. From a political point of view it would seem to make little difference whether these Chinese advisers and administrators were representatives of the Chinese Army or whether they were civilian personnel, providing they were officials of the Chinese Government and were directly under the command of the military government.
If the occupation of Formosa is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, the Chinese Government may expect to participate more actively in the civil administration of Formosa than if such an assault is solely by American sea-borne forces from the Pacific. Such participation may be expected to include the use of Chinese personnel in responsible administrative positions and representation by Chinese [Page 1271] civil affairs officers on the civil affairs staff in Formosa. Such participation by the Chinese would be essential if large numbers of Chinese forces had contributed to the occupation of Formosa.
III. Recommendations
It is recommended that the planning for military government in Formosa proceed on the following lines:
- 1)
- It is assumed that if the armed forces of the United States undertake and effect the occupation and liberation of Formosa, a military administration for civil affairs in Formosa will be established by the United States.
- 2)
- It is envisaged that American military administration of civil affairs in Formosa will continue until such time as Chinese sovereignty in Formosa is restored.
- 3)
- If the occupation of Formosa is aided by Chinese forces operating from the mainland, a military administration will, nevertheless, be established by the United States but there should be, if feasible, provision for Chinese representation on the civil affairs staff.
- 4)
- In any event, as the cooperation of the Chinese Government would be helpful for the effective functioning of this administration, Chinese participation should be sought in the planning of civil affairs in Formosa and properly qualified Chinese personnel should be entrusted with administrative and police functions under the military administration. As the time approaches for the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty over Formosa, it would be useful for the military administration to employ an increasingly larger number of Chinese personnel both in administrative and police functions and on the civil affairs staff.
Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East.
| TS: | GHBlakeslee | JA: | ERDickover |
| HBorton (drafting officer) | BRJohansen | ||
| RAFearey | FSWilliams | ||
| PRJosselyn | CA: | OEClubb | |
| MMKnight | LA: | ALMoffat | |
| FE: | JWBallantine | FMA: | CFRemer |
| AHiss | ME: | MBHall |
- PWC–200, Army-Navy questionnaire of June 2, not printed.↩