Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, The Far East, Volume V

711.94114A/7–1444: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

Bern, July 14, 1944.
[Received July 14—5:57 p.m.]

4507. American Interests—Japan. Department’s 1888, June 1. Swiss note July 13 contains following response from Japanese Foreign Office telegraphed July 12 by Swiss Legation, Tokyo.

“Japanese Government are prepared to render facilities in regard to transport via Soviet port of relief supplies and correspondence sent for distribution to American and Allied prisoners of war and internees in Japanese custody on following conditions:

I. 1. In view of negotiations hitherto conducted between Japanese and United States Government, Japanese Government have been under impression that American Government previously obtained consent of Soviet Government to transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence at Vladivostok. Said port being situated adjacent to Japan, it is considered from past experience that transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence would be conveniently effected there. Moreover, presence of Japanese consular service is necessary for Japanese ship to enter port and take delivery of supplies in question. For these reasons Japanese Government by their note of 28th April addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, replies to American Government that Vladivostok should be the port of delivery. Japanese Government, therefore, desire that American Government will further negotiate with Soviet Government so that Soviet Government’s consent to use of Vladivostok may be obtained.

2. Should, however, Soviet Government find it difficult to accede to above proposal as result of negotiations, Japanese Government would agree to make delivery of supplies at Nakhodka, provided that American Government obtain consent of Soviet Government to following:

(a) That two members of staff of Japanese Consulate General at Vladivostok be given facilities for coming to Nakhodka and being permitted to stay for a necessary period of time and to discharge their official duties relating to entry and clearance of Japanese ship and transshipment of relief supplies and correspondence.

(b) That captain and senior officers of Japanese ship be permitted to go ashore and communicate with said Japanese consular officials.

(c) That on arrival of Japanese ship at port she should be given first priority in entering port, enabled to load supplies without delays and allowed to leave port without any impediment.

(d) That indication of safe course of ship to be followed and all other facilities for transport of supplies be accorded to Japanese ship.

3. Japanese Government cannot see their way to agree, for reasons of distance and other considerations, to taking delivery of subsequent relief supplies and correspondence at Petropavlovsk but suggest Vladivostok as transshipping point, as has already been expressed in their note of 28th April addressed to Swiss Legation, Tokyo.

II. 1. As regards relief supplies and correspondence presumed to be now lying at Vladivostok, Japanese Government will take delivery of them to aggregate amount of 1,500 metric weight tons at Vladivostok or Nakhodka, whichever port is agreed upon, by a single voyage if possible.

2. As to subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence, it will be necessary to take into consideration capacity of Japanese ship to be sent for the purpose and Japanese Government will each time notify American Government of quantity which can be taken. However, Japanese Government considers that it would be difficult to take 1,500 metric weight tons each month as desired by American Government.

III. American Government shall pay all taxes, rates, dues and all other public charges which may be levied on Japanese ship at Soviet port to be agreed upon, cost of loading of Japanese ship, freight charges from such port or [for?] ports under Japanese administration, cost of landing and warehousing at ports under same administration, and any and all other expenses calculated on fair and reasonable basis.

Japanese Government are ready to defray import duty and other taxes to be charged at ports under Japanese administration and freight charges by Japanese Government railway.

IV. American Government shall give guarantee of safety to Japanese ship to be engaged in transport of relief supplies and correspondence between ports under Japanese administration and Soviet port to be agreed upon and shall obtain guarantee of safety for said ship from all other interested governments (including Soviet Government). Japanese Government will notify American Government of details of itinerary of such Japanese ship at least 7 days prior to her departure. Full description of ship will also be communicated.

V. With regard to subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence to be distributed to American and Allied prisoners of war and internees referred to in paragraph II (2) above, Japanese Government suggest that dispatch of parcels addressed to specific individuals should be refrained from for time being since it is expected that delivery of such parcels to their respective recipients will be accompanied by considerable difficulties.

VI. It is understood that in case Japanese Government send any relief supplies and correspondence for distribution to Japanese and Allied prisoners of war and internees in United States custody American Government shall take necessary steps for transport of them by route and method similar to present proposal.”

Note dated April 28 referred to in Section I above corresponds quoted text Legation’s 2949, May 10.

Harrison

[On July 17 the Department sent to the British Embassy a statement of the number of American civilians held in Japanese custody as of July 12, as follows: Philippine Islands, 4768; China, 964; Japan, 173; Malaya, 35; Manchuria, 9; Borneo, 9; Indochina, 8; Thailand, 7; Burma, 6; Sumatra, 3; Korea, 1; and Formosa, 1.

The statement was described as providing a “fairly reliable estimate” but was “not entirely accurate” because the protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red Cross had not been able to furnish complete reports.]