865.01/2208: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 17—12:05 a.m.]
875. I am not sure that I made plain in my 856, March 14, 10 p.m. my feeling regarding the lack of consultation in arranging for the exchange of representatives between the Soviet and Badoglio Governments and the manner in which we should deal with it.
[Page 1056]On the one hand I feel strongly that we should not let the Soviets get away with this sharp practice without full understanding of its adverse reaction on us and on the American public as well if the facts become generally known. This would only invite the Soviets to do the same sort of thing again at a time when it might have more serious consequences. It is not at all clear why they did this—whether they have some devious motive behind the act or whether it is an indication that they wish to keep a free hand on all matters which they do not consider basically affect us or on which they do not have a specific prior agreement to consult. In any event their act it seems to us here strikes at the heart of the spirit of collaboration we believed had been initiated at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences90 and therefore the incident although perhaps of lesser importance in its substance is of major importance in its method.
I would therefore recommend against any course of action on our part which would produce in the Soviet mind the impression that we did not regard it seriously. Just how to accomplish this without magnifying the incident in the public mind in America beyond its importance is a matter of tactics regarding which it is difficult for me to make a specific recommendation as I am out of touch with the feel of things at home. I wish therefore to withdraw the specific suggestion that I made in my cable and to limit my recommendation to the objective described above as I do not feel qualified at this end to suggest a method. Another idea that comes to mind however which might be given consideration is a personal telegram from the President to Stalin91 or one from you to Molotov.
We have a long and perhaps difficult road while the Soviets learn how to behave in the civilized world community. Effective results can I believe be obtained by taking a firm position when they take improper steps. They certainly do not hesitate to be abrupt with us when they do not like our proposals or actions. If we don’t follow this procedure now in connection with each incident we may well look forward to a Soviet policy of playing the part of a world bully.
We must of course be prepared to exercise patience, but forbearance is a sign of weakness to these people. They respect firmness even though they may not fully understand the reasons behind it.
- For records of the Tehran Conference, held November 27–December 2, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943. For records of the Moscow Conference, held October 18–November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 513 ff.↩
- Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.↩