865.01/2212a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)
783. For Reinhardt. The following exchange of telegrams has taken place between the President and the Prime Minister on the Italian political situation. You may in your discretion pass this information on to Reber.
March 7 from the President to the Prime Minister:83
“Our advices from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.
“General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.
“One of General Wilson’s telegrams of February 29 (Naf 634) reports that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a ‘Lieutenant’ of the Realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian Government.
“If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early Dart of the week.”
March 8 from the Prime Minister to the President:84
“I am concerned about your Number 490. This message is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 46485) which in your Number 483 you kindly reaffirmed describing the matter as ‘finished business’. I made my statement to Parliament on the strength of the first assurances.
“I do not find any reason to believe from my advices that any new facts of importance have arisen or that order cannot be maintained by the Allied forces in the regions which they occupy as the result of the Italian ‘unconditional surrender’. I think it would be a very grievous mistake to yield to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of politicians who are seeking office. We should then be liable to establish in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but would attempt to make its position with the Italian people by standing up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the de Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of Badoglio and the King in the midst of a heart-shaking battle, which is trying to aid us and work its passage.
“The course you recommend, I readily admit, would have at least a transitory success and would be more popular. But it would be unfortunate, I am sure, for the victorious conquerors to have their hands forced this way by sections of the defeated population. The obvious open division between you and me and between our two Governments would likewise be unfortunate. I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary than at the present time to have unity of action between our two Governments considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead. I am quite willing to discuss with you now the proposals set forth by General Wilson in his Naf 634 whereby the Crown Prince becomes Lieutenant of the Realm. I understand from Macmillan that Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. I have no confidence in either Sforza or Croce. Vyshinsky tried to read these books and found them even duller than Karl Marx.86 In his letter to Mr. Berle of September [19]43,87 Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings. I hope therefore that we may open discussions with you on the basis of Eden’s telegram No. 1783 to Halifax.88 I repeat that I am most anxious to have a broad based government assume power in Italy, but this can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken, and ought not to be done under duress by the Allies. Macmillan is returning immediately.”
March 8 to the Prime Minister:
“Your 610. My dispatch No. 490 on the Italian political situation was sent with the purpose of trying to meet the difficulties presented in Naf 634 by General Wilson.
“I would appreciate your sending me suggestions as to a way to remedy the serious situation which will be acceptable to your Government.
“That you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others is my strongest wish. Things like timing, on which we may differ, can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self-determination we are in complete agreement.”
March 13 to the Prime Minister:89
“With further reference to your No. 610, I am sorry if my earlier messages were not clear. I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken. The political situation in Italy has developed rapidly since our earlier messages; the military situation has not kept pace. The capture of Rome is still remote and major political decisions must be taken.
“I do not like having to use stern measures against our friends in Italy, except for good reason. In the present situation the Commander-in-Chief and his political advisers, both British and American, have recommended that we give immediate support to the program of the six opposition parties. Thus we have, happily for once, our political and military considerations entirely in harmony.
“We do not need to intervene beyond informing the Executive Junta of our support of their program, as described in Naf 622, 624 and 628, and confirm this to the King if necessary. The Italians can present the solution to the King and work out the program among themselves.
“I cannot for the life of me understand why we should hesitate any longer in supporting a policy so admirably suited to our common military and political aims. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel.”
- This message is No. 490, March 7. 1944.↩
- This message is No. 610, dated March 8, 1944.↩
- This telegram is printed in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing the Ring (Boston, 1959), p. 497. President Roosevelt stated that he had directed the Department of State to take no action toward effecting any change in the existing Government of Italy “at the present time”.↩
- German philosopher, 1818–1883, co-author of Communist Manifesto and Das Kapital.↩
- Not found in Department files.↩
- See footnote 77, p. 1043.↩
- Presumably this message is No. 498, March 13, 1944.↩