Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: D.O./P.R./36
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks Conversations—Thirty-eighth Day
Second Plenary Session of Conversations With the Chinese
Dr. Koo presented for the first time the views of the Chinese group on the present document. He commended the proposals highly and expressed satisfaction that so many points in the Chinese memorandum had been included. He stated, however, that the Chinese group wished to raise several points for consideration. While these [Page 864] points might be implicit in the document, and were in no sense contradictory to it, the Chinese felt that explicit provisions concerning these matters would strengthen the Organization and enlist for it broader support.
The seven points raised by Dr. Koo were as follows:
(a) Law and Justice in the Settlement of Disputes
Dr. Koo suggested that reference be made to a body of law or principles of justice as criteria for the pacific settlement of disputes, on the grounds that such reference would expedite settlement, reinforce confidence, and offer assurance that the Organization would not degenerate into an instrument of power politics.
(b) Respect for Independence and Territorial Integrity
Dr. Koo stated the Chinese view that a provision concerning respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of member states would foster the sense of security, particularly among the smaller states, and would give moral content to the stated purposes of the Organization.
(c) Definition of Aggression
The Chinese group would prefer to see “aggression” defined, preferably by means of an illustrative, but not comprehensive, list of acts. More explicit definition would, they felt, facilitate swift action by the Council, inspire confidence, restrain potential aggressors, and enable world opinion to recognize an aggressor immediately.
(d) An International Air Force
The Chinese favor an international air force under the direct control of the Council as a means of enabling the Council to act quickly and as a symbol of the Council’s authority. Dr. Koo felt that the principle of such a force, as suggested in the present document, might provide a basis upon which details could be worked out by military experts.
(e) Codification of International Law
The codification of international law is regarded by the Chinese as of great importance to the promotion of security under law. They favor the development of new rules of law through study, and through action by the Assembly.
(f) Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court
The Chinese favor extending the compulsory jurisdiction of the international court over justiciable disputes, and prefer to have this provided in the charter of the Organization rather than by amendment of the statute of the present Court.[Page 865]
(g) Cultural Cooperation
The Chinese recognize that cultural cooperation is already within the scope of the Organization under the present document, but wish to give greater emphasis to it.
Meeting of the Special Military Group
Military representatives of the three Governments72 discussed at length this afternoon the matter of an international air force. The Chinese were personally satisfied that the present provision would adequately take care of what they have in mind and are wiring Chungking to this effect.
Meeting of the Joint Formulation Group73
The joint formulation group met this afternoon to review the present document and to consider the additional points raised by Dr. Koo.
- For China, Generals Shang and Mow, Admiral Liu, and Mr. Pu Hsueh-feng with Dr. Tan and Dr. Chen as counselors and secretaries; for the United Kingdom, Air Vice-Marshal Willock, Commodore Clarke, and General Grove-White; and for the United States, Generals Strong and Fairchild and Admiral Train, with Messrs. Donald C. Blaisdell and Clyde Eagleton, Col. Paul W. Caraway, and Capt. John M. Creighton as advisers and secretaries. (Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 332.)↩
- The Joint Formulation Group in this phase was larger and more formal in its conduct of discussion than in the preceding period; it met four times between October 3 and October 7. See Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 331–332.↩