The Secretary of State has now received a letter of September 22, 1944
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff85 commenting on the two policy documents transmitted
to London with the Department’s instruction no. 4278 of July 8, 1944,
namely, PWC–218 entitled “The Treatment of Austria” and PWC–217a
entitled “Summary: The Treatment of Austria: Policy
Recommendations.”
For your information and guidance a copy of the comments of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is enclosed herewith, with the Department’s reply given
in parentheses after each paragraph of the comments.
[Enclosure]
Comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
Papers PWC–217a and PWC–21886
1. It is suggested that these papers be modified to conform with the
most recently stated views of this government (C.C.S. 320/21) to the
effect that “There is no change in the policy of the United States
Government as regards occupational forces for Austria except that a
token force similar to the force planned for Berlin may be sent to
Austria in connection with a tripartite control of Austria that may
be agreed upon.”
(The Department of State concurs in the arrangement whereby only
token forces of the United States should be sent to Vienna in
connection with the tripartite control of Austria and the local
administration of Vienna.)
2. Paragraph II–(A) 16 of PWC–217a provides that the occupation and
control of Austria should be separate from the military government
of Germany. It is suggested that consideration may well be given to
placing Austria, in the initial period following the defeat or
surrender of Germany, under the over-all control of the Control
Council which it is proposed to establish in Berlin. Inasmuch as
consideration is now being given to placing both Germany and Austria
under tripartite control of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., it is
believed that the inclusion of Austria in the initial period within
the jurisdiction of the Control Council in Berlin might facilitate
sound administration, particularly in view of the fact that Austria
is presently controlled by the German Government in Berlin. It is
agreed that the occupation and control of Austria should be
separated from the military government of Germany as soon as
conditions warrant, but the possible desirability of controlling
Austria through the combined machinery in Berlin at least for a
brief initial period and until existing German controls can be
untangled, should not be overlooked.
(The Department recognizes the administrative soundness and necessity
of vesting control of Austria in the Allied Authority in Berlin for
a brief initial period. Political considerations and the attitude
toward Austria expressed in paragraph I–A–1 of PWC–217a, however,
make it desirable that a separate administration be established for
Austria as quickly as military and administrative conditions make it
feasible. Rather than postpone the establishment of a separate
regime for Austria until German controls can be disposed of, the
Department of State believes that the untangling of Austro-German
affairs should be carried forward through liaison offices in each
capital.)
[Page 464]
3. Paragraph II–(A)17 of PWC–217a and paragraph III–(A)2 of PWC–218
suggest that control of Austria be transferred at an early date from
the military authorities to an inter-Allied civilian agency which
would be supported by military garrisons as needed. The transfer of
control of what must presently be considered as enemy territory to
civilian control is a question involving consideration of many
factors, and the time when such transfer could be effected would be
dependent in large part upon conditions as they existed in Austria
at the time such transfer should be proposed. It is not believed
that any decision could be made on this point at the present
time.
(The Department of State agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
the time of transferring control of Austria from military to
civilian authorities will need to be determined in the light of
future developments.)
4. Paragraph II–(B)21 of PWC–217a provides that “Austrian members of
the Wehrmacht should be sent home without unnecessary delay.” It is
believed that this should be a general objective to be sought rather
than an indiscriminate policy without qualification. There may be
violent Nazis among this group whom the occupational authorities may
wish to retain in custody as prisoners of war or otherwise. Their
Austrian nationality would not necessarily be the controlling
factor. It is believed that the policy referred to is more properly
stated in paragraph III–(B)1 of PWC–218.
(The brief statement with respect to Austrians serving in the
Wehrmacht in paragraph II–B–21 of PWC–217a properly requires the
qualifications contained in paragraph III–B–1 of PWC–218. The
viewpoint back of the two statements is that Austria’s political
reconstruction should be started as expeditiously as possible, and
this process is dependent in large measure on the return of
politically acceptable soldiers to their homes. If it becomes
established Allied policy to hold active Nazis in custody or exact
labor services from them, Austrian Nazis should receive the same
treatment as the German.)
5. Paragraph II–(C)26 of PWC–217a and paragraph III–(C)3 of PWC–218
provide that Germans whose residence in Austria is connected with
Nazi exploitation should be promptly deported to Germany. It is
believed possible that there may be Germans in this category, such
as war criminals, et cetera, whose deportation to Germany would be
neither necessary nor advisable.
(The stated policy with respect to the deportation of Germans from
Austria is limited to “those Germans whose residence in Austria is
directly connected with the Nazi exploitation of that state.” It is
not intended to prejudice treatment to be meted out to war criminals
or other Germans liable to legal proceedings. The objective here
envisaged [Page 465] is the
elimination of carpet-baggers whose presence in Austria would be
injurious to orderly political and economic reconstruction.)
6. Paragraph II–(B) 3 of PWC–218 provides for the maintenance of a
civil police force composed “exclusively of Austrian nationals.”
Such a provision is considered inadvisable inasmuch as there may be
members of the civil police force who are not Austrian nationals
whom it may be desirable to retain. The hands of the occupational
authorities should not be tied by a restriction of this
character.
(The provision that the police force should be composed “exclusively
of Austrian nationals” grows out of the necessity to rid Austria of
Nazi and pan-German influence and to prevent a new infiltration into
such a critically important function as the police. However, this
represents a general statement of policy which the Department does
not regard as preventing the military government from retaining any
particular individuals in the interest of security.)
7. Paragraph III–(D)3 of PWC–218 provides for “border control over
trade between Austria and Germany.” It is believed that trade
between Austria and all countries should be
controlled by the occupational authorities during the military
government period.
(The Department of State concurs in the view that the occupation
authorities should control the whole of Austria’s foreign trade
during the period of military government. The paragraph calling for
control of trade with Germany in particular was not intended to
exclude control of other trade.)
8. It is believed that the reference in paragraph III–(D) 5 of
PWC–218 to “special commitments on the part of the United Nations
with respect to Austria” should be clarified, as its meaning is not
understood in its present form.
(The policy with respect to reparation payments by Austria will be
given specific formulation later. Paragraph III–D–5 of PWC–218,
therefore, may be considered held in abeyance.)
9. Paragraph III–(E)1 of PWC–218 provides for the reestablishment of
Austrian political life on an enduring constitutional basis “as soon
as political conditions have become reasonably stable and there is
clear evidence of a desire by the Austrian people to act.” It is
believed that this recommendation should be amended to assure
consideration of the paramount requirements of military
necessity.
(The reference in paragraph III–E–1 of PWC–218 to reasonably stable
political conditions as a prerequisite to beginning the work of
political reconstruction is interpreted in the Department of State
to mean that no steps should be taken without due consideration of
the requirements of military necessity.)