740.0011 European War/11–1044
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
My Dear Ed: As you will know, a draft directive to Eisenhower on the post-defeat military government of Germany was laid by the United States Chiefs of Staff before the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval and referred by the latter to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC 119/4).
[Page 390]This matter has been discussed off the record between Macready and Jack McCloy. Ministers have given it full consideration in London and I have now been instructed to give you their views.
By agreement between the three Governments at the Moscow Conference,52 the treatment of Germany was remitted to the E.A.C. for tripartite study. The object of this was, of course, to secure, if possible, the co-ordination of Soviet policy towards Germany with British and United States policies as well as co-ordination between the two latter. As the E.A.C. had not yet got around to this increasingly urgent question, Anthony, as you know, during his recent visit to Moscow53 urged the Soviet Government to instruct the Soviet representative on the E.A.C. to agree to begin discussions on this subject. In reply the Soviet Government have agreed to give first priority in the Commission’s work to German questions, and the way appears to be clear for immediate discussion by the E.A.C. of the ground covered by the draft directive.
Our suggestion is that Winant should now circulate the draft directive to the E.A.C. The Foreign Office tell me that Strang would join the United States Delegation in pressing the Soviet Delegation to discuss it without delay together with the British papers on the subject, and to make early recommendations to the three governments. Pending such discussion in the Commission, the British Delegation would be willing to communicate their observations on the United States draft informally to the United States Delegation and to try to clarify their respective points of view. If the three-Power discussion in the Commission itself were long delayed, the British Delegation would be willing to try to reach an informal understanding with the United States Delegation on a single document which could, in an emergency, be conveyed to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief. We could justify such a course to the Russians, since it would only be adopted if they unreasonably delayed discussion in the Commission.
Having got the Russians to the point of agreeing to immediate discussions in the E.A.C. of post-defeat policy, London feel that there are considerable dangers in starting separate Anglo-American discussions in Washington on the same subject, however informally. They very much hope, therefore, that the above alternative procedure will commend itself; it provides, as you see, for an agreed Anglo-American emergency directive should the Russians not come up to scratch on the E.A.C. after all.
[Page 391]Macready and I would be very ready to discuss this matter with you and Jack McCloy if you so desired.
I have sent a copy of this letter to Jack.
Yours ever,
- Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943: for correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, pp. 513 ff.↩
- Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, accompanied Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow for the meetings with Premier Stalin between October 9 and 18. For correspondence relating to these meetings, see vol. iv, pp. 1002–1024.↩