Office of the Historian

740.00119 E.W./11–444

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

Washington, 4 November, 1944.

Dear Ed: The enclosed is the memorandum which I delivered to Secretary Morgenthau as our general views on the British draft directives for Germany.

The first memorandum I saw which the Treasury had prepared I objected to primarily on the ground that it brought up long range considerations which, in accordance with the government policy, should not be dealt with now. I then delivered the enclosed memorandum to Mr. Morgenthau as representative of the War Department’s views on the British directives. Apparently Mr. Morgenthau went on and delivered a somewhat modified version of his earlier memorandum to Lord Cherwell, but one which did not eliminate the long range points that were included in his first draft. Whether he also delivered the War Department’s views I have not been able to find out.

I do not know that the matter is of any great moment, but I think that pretty soon we had better get together, particularly while Winant is here, to crystallize our position in respect of these British directives.

I have kept Dunn and Matthews informed of my discussions with Mr. Morgenthau and they know the background. I think you may want to pass this memorandum on to them.

Sincerely,

J[ohn] J. M[cCloy]
[Enclosure]

Memorandum Regarding British Draft Policy Directives for Germany

[Washington,] 1 November, 1944.
1.
Examination of the British document does not disclose whether it was intended as a long-range program or for the immediate period after the surrender and occupation of Germany.
2.
It is the U.S. view that this is not the moment to discuss a long-range view. The wishes of other United Nations must be considered before the long-range policy toward Germany can be crystallized. Until we have entered a considerable portion of Germany and know the conditions that are existent there, it is impossible to formulate final policy with respect to the treatment of Germany.
3.
Further, the directives as presently written are too detailed to be considered on a governmental level. As written these directives would be protocol between the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., and it would be most difficult to modify, change or vary such agreements as conditions require.
4.
The substance of the British directives are matters of detail primarily to be considered on an operational level such as the Control Council for Germany or at SCAEF. It is desirable that EAC consideration should be given on a broad overall level providing guidance to the military commanders to enable them to formulate detailed plans.
5.
The British approach treats Germany on the basis of an armistice rather than unconditional surrender or complete military defeat, and retains German administrative structures and organs to an extent greater than is desired.
6.
Conditions throughout Germany may not be uniform and in the light of this consideration the British document does not insure to the zone commanders the full freedom of action which in the U.S. view is essential.
7.
It is considered that JCS 1067 is the proper approach to the immediate requirements in that it will provide the zone commanders with all the guidance necessary at this time.