740.00119 E.W./11–344
The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Washington, November 3,
1944.
Dear Ed: I am sending you herewith Memorandum
on the British Draft of Policy Directive for Germany.
This was shown to the War Department, and with their approval I gave a
copy of it to Lord Cher well39
just before he left.40
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum on the British Draft of Policy
Directive for Germany*
[Washington,] November 1,
1944.
- 1.
- Examination of the British document suggests that it was
intended as a long range program. We are not prepared to make
decisions on these long range issues at this time. Moreover, the
British document does not cover the major questions involved.
If, on the other hand, the British document is only intended as
an interim program it prejudices the long range decision on
important issues. In any event, its 97 pages of detailed
instructions, often on unimportant points, is not a satisfactory
medium for a high level policy determination. The document
confuses principles with details of administration, and thus
does not provide a basis on which decisions can be readily
reached through the exchange of views. We feel strongly that we
should confine our discussions now to the major policy decisions
needed for the interim period and leave the details to be worked
out at a staff level.
- 2.
- The appropriate document for immediate discussion is the
American interim directive document. This document is to the
large part a statement of principles which after agreement would
provide the basis for the preparation of handbooks containing
full details for administration. The failure of the British
Government to present
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its views on this document is preventing further progress of
combined discussions on the treatment to be accorded Germany. We
are faced with the danger that the prolongation of the period in
which the military directive operates will seriously prejudice
the situation within Germany and limit the effectiveness of long
range policies which may be found to be desirable by the three
governments.
- 3.
- The following are some of the major policy issues which the
British document fails to deal with adequately and which must be
dealt with in any long range program:
- (a)
- The elimination or destruction of heavy industry in
Germany, specifically the metallurgical, chemical and
electrical industries in Germany.
- (b)
- Future boundaries of Germany.
- (c)
- Partitioning of Germany.
- (d)
- Disposition of the Ruhr through internationalization
or otherwise.
- (e)
- Restitution.
- (f)
- Reparations, including whether there will be
reparations in the form of recurring payments.
- (g)
- A comprehensive educational program.
- (h)
- A positive program for political
decentralization.
- (i)
- The character of controls to be employed in preventing
re-emergence of a powerful industrial Germany.
- (j)
- Agrarian reform including the breaking up of the
Junker estates.
- (k)
- The punishment of war crimes and the apprehension of
war criminals.
- (l)
- The extradition of war criminals to the scene of their
crimes.
- 4.
- While it is difficult to evaluate the significance of the
detailed policy questions without an understanding of the
underlying objectives, the following comments on the British
group of directives may indicate the difference in approach:
- (a)
- Administrative convenience is frequently placed above
principle in dealing with problems of German
occupation.
- (b)
- In defining specifically certain of the powers which
the Occupation Commander will have, the document tends
to obscure the fact that the Commander-in-Chief will
have all the powers of government and has the power to
do whatever is necessary to carry out the program
determined by the Allies.
- (c)
- In connection with the punishment of infractions of
regulations and instructions of the occupying forces,
there is a tendency in the directive to rely on
inadequate and indirect punishments and sanctions when
there is no occasion for avoiding direct
penalties.
- (d)
- The Allied Commanders are given too much
responsibility for the well functioning of the German
economy.
- (e)
- The list of persons to be detained and placed under
guard for political and security reasons is totally
inadequate and vests too much discretion in the Allied
Commander-in-Chief. It gives an appearance of an attempt
to shift responsibility.
- (f)
- There is too much political freedom given to the
Germans.
- (g)
- The program for keeping the German schools and
universities open at any cost ignores the need for a
fundamental reorientation of German educational
institutions.
- (h)
- We see no point in giving the Allied Military
Commander discretion in making it possible for the
German “police” to be able to retain tanks and heavy
weapons. This sounds like the beginning of the
rearmament of Germany.
- (i)
- If Austria is to be given substantially better
treatment than Germany, the treatment to be accorded
Austria should be dealt with in a separate set of
directives.
