740.0011 European War 1939/31593⅟₇
The Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Dear Sumner: The other day while Padilla7 and I were discussing some major factors in our relationships and particularly with respect to the situation in Mexico, he referred to a conversation which he had with you either in Monterrey or Corpus Christi with respect to the possible participation of elements of the Mexican armed forces in the conflict. Padilla said that he felt more and more that it was desirable for some elements of the Mexican armed forces to participate in the actual conflict. He said that the situation within the country was on the whole developing satisfactorily but that naturally Mexico was further away from the war and that it was difficult for the great masses of the people to appreciate all of the implications of the war for Mexico and Mexico’s responsibility. This was even more so now that the probability of attack on this continent was more remote. He said that during the last weeks increasingly high ranking officials of the Mexican army had spoken to him about what they considered the real importance and interest of elements of the Mexican armed forces taking part in the conflict. They all realized the practical difficulties in the way but they felt, as military men, that it was not in accord with Mexico’s dignity and her place among the United Nations that her army did not bear a part of the sacrifices of the war. He said it was very interesting that these officers were very outspoken and definite in their opinion and he was sure that the President shared their opinion. He said that a good many of the high ranking officers felt chagrined that General Cárdenas8 should have made a statement some time ago that Mexico could not take any actual part in the armed conflict because her men had nothing to fight with and they resented his statement.
Padilla said that the thing which preoccupied him was that the United Nations, or at least most of them, were making so many sacrifices in the way of blood and treasure and that these would undoubtedly increase before the end of the war came. He considered it very probable that there would have to be a land invasion of Europe before the end of the war and that this would involve very heavy sacrifices in blood. He could understand that there would be quite an internal reaction among the people of the United States to the effect that some of the other American Republics had not done their share in the way of actual sacrifice. He personally, and he was sure the President, felt the way some of these high military officers felt, that [Page 405] it would be a very good thing all around if there could be some participation by Mexican elements in the actual conflict. He did not know how this could be done but he thought it would be desirable to explore the situation.
I told him that there were many difficulties in the way of having elements from the armed forces of the other American Republics participating in the conflict. These, I was sure, were familiar to him. Among these was the question of transport, organization and command. I agreed with him, I said, that it would be desirable to have such elements participate in the conflict, particularly from Mexico and Brazil. As I saw it, however, it would be exceedingly difficult to arrange for the present for elements of the army to participate—although this also was a subject which should receive consideration. In my opinion the most practical way would be to have Mexican pilots as a Mexican escadrille participate at the front. I saw few fundamental difficulties in the way of this, for the Mexican army now had a considerable number of trained pilots and all they needed was a little further final training before being able to fly combat ships. I said that I thought the idea of a Mexican flying unit was one which could be considered, but of course I was not able to pass any final word on this.
Padilla said that he thought it would be a splendid thing if arrangements could be made for a Mexican and Brazilian flying unit to participate in actual combat in aerial warfare at some of the fronts. He thought this was an entirely practicable and feasible idea and it would be a fine entering wedge. It was something which could be arranged with small delay and was entirely practical from practically every point of view. He thought that it could easily be confined at the outset to a Mexican and Brazilian unit. He said that he would be very glad if I would explore this idea with you entirely informally for the present and he asked me when doing so to refer to the conversation which he had had with you in this respect during the exchange of visits between the two Presidents.
My own feeling is that it would be desirable to do something along these lines, and as I think the question of army units is impracticable still, it would be desirable to do something from the point of view of an air unit. Our Army and Navy officials recognize the fact that the Mexican pilots are excellent. All they need is a little extra training. There would seem to be no fundamental difficulty in having a Mexican and Brazilian air unit participate on the actual combat fronts.
I believe it would be a good thing to explore this with the Secretary and with the President and with our military officials, and to let me have an initial reaction which I can give to Padilla and to the President. [Page 406] I am sure that Padilla had talked this over with the President before he mentioned it to me the other day. Of course the explorations should be informal and confidential and there should be nothing publicly said about this until decisions may be reached.
… I think the most feasible approach is through air combat units. I should be very happy if you would explore this situation and let me know the reactions in an altogether informal and confidential way which I can pass on to Padilla and the President.
With all good wishes,
Cordially and faithfully yours,