Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

811B.01/482

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, September 8, 1943.

The Secretary of State offers the following comments seriatim on the numbered paragraphs in the letter dated September 1, 1943, herewith returned, from the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ickes, on the subject of possible legislation changing the date for granting independence to the Philippines. There is also offered comment pertinent to the observations made by Mr. Ickes on the question of the succession to the Presidency of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

1. It is understood that the rehabilitation plan now in preparation by the Interior Department contemplates a broad and substantial program for the rebuilding of the economy of the Philippines. It is conceivable that the Congress, which will be called upon to sanction the program, might be more disposed to deal with the subject while the Government of the United States retains sovereign rights over the Islands rather than at a time when such rights no longer exist. Certainly the implementing of such a program would be facilitated, granted that you and the Congress give approval to the plan, if it could be carried out under the sole authority of this Government. To fix a new date for granting independence to the Philippines without regard to the rehabilitation program might well jeopardize the carefully worked out plans for the rebuilding of Philippine economy. There is, of course, the possibility that the Congress might wish to consider merging into one act the independence question and the rehabilitation program, with machinery for implementing the latter as soon as possible after the enemy has been driven from the Islands.

2. The Tydings–McDuffie Act⁹ already contains authority for the retention of naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines after complete independence is granted. It is understood, however, that the Commonwealth authorities now feel that not only an adequate naval force should be maintained in the Islands but that a formidable air force will also be required. It is most likely that the entire question of defense for the Philippines will be reviewed when the Congress next gives consideration to Philippine affairs. There will probably be an insistent demand from Filipino leaders for protective measures of a much broader character than was contemplated when the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed. This is a subject concerning which the appropriate officials of the War and Navy Departments are in better position to make recommendations, based on experience and expert knowledge, than are officials of the Department of State. Nevertheless, it can be said that the principle of maintaining naval facilities in the Philippines after independence is granted is already recognized in the Tydings-McDuffie Act and that what remains to be done is to decide in what form and to what extent these facilities and other security measures will be maintained after the Philippines become independent.

3. If a plan for economic rehabilitation of the Philippines is submitted to the Congress before the termination of the war, as is now contemplated, its merits could be determined solely on the basis of the general welfare of the people of a dependency and on the basis of the regulation of our domestic trade. To carry out such a program by negotiation with a separate and distinct government would result in delay and add confusion to a situation already confounded. In view of the circumstances existing today in the Philippines, it would seem to be advisable at least to await the submission of the rehabilitation program before fixing a new or an indeterminate date for Philippine independence.

4. While a large number of important and well-known Filipino political and industrial leaders are now working actively with the puppet government at Manila, the expulsion of the Japanese from the Islands will quickly alleviate that condition. The puppets will disappear quickly from the scene and their influence will probably have disappeared with them.

5. The one certain way to make it possible for the Filipinos to exercise their full right to elect their own officials is to expel the enemy from the Islands by military force with a minimum of delay. The machinery for the administration of the affairs of the Commonwealth Government was running as smoothly as could be expected up to the time of the Japanese occupation, and it must be assumed that the Filipinos will be perfectly capable of restoring this machinery to normal functioning once they are rid of Japanese control. The exercise of free suffrage could therefore be restored to pre-war status fairly soon after the exit of the Japanese from the Islands. The presence of an American army of occupation would certainly not be incompatible with the exercise of the right of free suffrage.

Reports have been current recently of plans purporting to make it possible for President Quezon to succeed himself notwithstanding the constitutional bar against the President of the Commonwealth serving more than eight years consecutively. The latest plan reported is one said to contemplate that Mr. Osmeña should become President on November 15, 1943, the date on which President Quezon’s eight years of incumbency expires, with the understanding that a Council of State to administer the affairs of the Commonwealth will be appointed by Mr. Osmeña, with Mr. Quezon as President of the Council. Still other reports, all unconfirmed thus far, include one to the effect that, the de facto authority of the Commonwealth Government having been extinguished by the Japanese by reason of the military occupation of the Islands, you will be asked by Mr. Quezon, at an appropriate time before the expiration of his tenure of office, to appoint, in your capacity as the head of the government that exercises de jure sovereign rights in the Philippines, an Administrator of the affairs of the Philippines. It is surmised that Mr. Quezon might hope that he would be appointed Administrator. When or whether this or any other plan will be submitted to you is not known, but if the will of the Filipino people as expressed in their constitution is ignored by the Commonwealth authorities at Washington so as to alter the right of succession to the Presidency, it is believed that the reaction in the Philippines cannot but be unfavorable and that such a deviation would be looked upon as a contravention of democratic principles of government.

C[ordell] H[ull]

9. Approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.