Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

811B.01/482

The Secretary of the Interior ( Ickes ) to President Roosevelt ⁵

Washington , September 1, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President: Mr. Byrnes⁶ has learned that Senator Tydings⁷ is willing to introduce a resolution, which presumably would have the effect of promising Philippine independence coincident with ousting the Japanese from the Islands, or with the military government of occupation. While it is difficult to advise on undrafted legislation, I should like to record my view that there are several reasons which argue strongly against the immediate consideration of legislation of the type suggested:

1. The Department in consultation with Commonwealth authorities has drafted a generous and effective program for Philippine rehabilitation. Prospects for favorable action would be diminished if Congress had previously passed an independence resolution.

2. President Quezon desires that the United States rather than (or in addition to) an international body provide for the military security of the Philippines. He rests this policy on your statement of December 28, 1941,⁸ “… that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected To further this purpose he wishes the United States to establish naval and air bases in the Islands. If this policy is followed, our military authorities may prefer to arrange for the bases prior to independence.

3. Commonwealth officers expect a recontinuance of trade relations with the United States on a basis of greater preferences than appear available through reciprocal trade agreements. It would probably be desirable to recommend legislation on a “domestic” basis prior to further Congressional action on independence.

4. Since Japanese occupation nearly all important Nationalist Party and pro-Spanish leaders remaining in the Philippines have accepted Japanese commissions and have formed a puppet government. On the contrary, it appears that the common people have remained loyal and have supported guerrilla activities. If independence should coincide with the ousting of the Japanese or with the military government, the collaborationists would be in a position to obtain initial control over the new government.

5. In February of this year, President Quezon broadcast to his people, “This (establishment of the Philippine Republic) cannot happen until our country is liberated from the invader—until you, my fellow citizens, can exercise your full right to elect the officials of the Government of the Republic.” I considered this a sound pronouncement. I believe that no action should be permitted to endanger the orderly establishment of the independent state on the basis of free suffrage.

For the reasons set forth I am convinced that, while independence should be granted as soon as practicable after the war, the best interests of both the United States and the Philippines would be served by a schedule which would admit carrying out the rehabilitation program under our auspices to a stage where its success would be reasonably assured, and the prior settlement of the principal terms of military security and trade relations. I am equally convinced that there must be adequate time and legal provision for weeding out collaborationist influence and for holding elections under civil control.

A further Philippine matter is of present concern. The Commonwealth constitution limits the term of the president to eight consecutive years and provides for automatic succession of the vice president in the event the president is disqualified for any reason. President Quezon will complete eight consecutive years in office on November 15, 1943. In the plebiscite for the adoption of the 1940 amendments and in the 1941 elections the voters were given clearly to understand that the succession would occur in due order. While Vice President Osmeña expects to succeed, elements attached to President Quezon may work to avoid the legal succession, and worse, to maneuver you into responsibility for setting aside the Commonwealth constitutional provisions. It is anticipated that you may be advised to this step by army authorities on asserted grounds of military advantage.

Since the beginning of United States occupancy of the Philippines the organic laws have been strictly followed on both sides. Osmeña is capable and loyal and he has enjoyed a popularity among the Filipino people equal to that of Quezon. I believe that, regardless of other factors, failure to uphold the constitution would be a serious blow to the cause of future representative government in the Philippines, and that it would offer the enemy an opportunity for adverse propaganda among the Filipinos under their control.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

5. Copy transmitted by President Roosevelt on September 2 to the Secretary of State for comment.
6. James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization.
7. Millard E. Tydings, of Maryland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.
8. Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1942, p. 5.