811B.01/623

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

The Tydings Resolution10 presents the question of the immediate independence of the Philippines. The actual movements toward independence and all matters connected therewith are internal affairs and consequently under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. However, connected therewith there are certain phases which bring into focus the question of the foreign relations of the Philippines and of the United States and therewith the Department of State is concerned.

The interest of the Department of State in its international relations would be twofold. First, the relationship to be established between the Government of the United States and the Government of the independent Philippines. Second, the repercussions in the field of international politics caused by the independence of the Philippines.

Considering them separately—

1.
(a) The American Government would upon the attainment of independence by the Philippines immediately proceed to deal with the Government of the independent Philippines on that new basis. There would be an exchange of ambassadors and we would approach the new Government on an entirely new basis than that upon which we now deal with the Philippines.
(b) The military operations planned for the defeat of Japan contemplate the use of the Philippines as air and naval bases for the prosecution of the war against Japan. If the Philippines were granted their immediate independence, the United States Government would have to deal with that Government as an entirely independent concern. It is possible that members of the Government now present in the United States would reappear in the Philippine Islands to assume control of that part of the Islands freed from Japanese domination. The theory of dealing with that Government as an independent Government would raise difficulties because we would no longer have the right to exercise the authority we have under the present arrangement with the Philippines Commonwealth. It is even possible that members to be added to the Government there might take the position that they had contributed very heavily to the war and desired to be at peace and might assume a policy of neutrality. In that case it would be necessary for the United States to take steps which in effect would make war against the Philippines in order to reestablish ourselves in a position [Page 1103] to use those areas for military and naval bases for use in the operations against Japan.
2.
(a) There immediately is presented the repercussion in India and the effect of the independence for the Philippines upon the complicated and delicate situation which England faces in regard to India.11
(b) The propaganda use to which Japan might put the independent Philippines movement in the countries under her control, such as Burma and Indo-China.
(c) Omitted from Departmental consideration because it is a matter of internal affairs of the Philippines, nevertheless reference is made to the effective use Japan could make of propaganda amongst the Filipinos by stating that we had deserted them and that we had failed in our obligations to continue our protection over them during the period intervening before their attainment of complete independence.
(d) Growing out of the status of independence is to be considered the attitude which other governments would assume toward the Philippines and the question of their recognition of that entity. It cannot be assumed that the British Government would not recognize the independence of the Philippines but there is no doubt that that Government would probably consider the effect upon its own situation in India and the manner in which it might be affected by this new movement for independence. The same applies to the Netherlands Government and its relationship with the Netherlands East Indies.
(e) A number of other matters, concerning the changed relationship, that would present themselves in case the Philippines were granted their immediate independence appear on the memorandum hereto attached prepared by Mr. Lockhart.12 These, however, deal largely with the internal situation.

  1. S.J. Res. 81, introduced in the Senate on September 24, 1943, Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 6, p. 7813.
  2. For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 178 ff., passim.
  3. Memorandum of October 1 by Frank P. Lockhart, Chief of the Office of Philippine Affairs, not printed.