860F.001/163: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 20—8:50 p.m.]
2264. For the President and the Secretary of State. I had a long talk yesterday with Beneš alone which will be resumed Monday.9
1. Beneš is elated over his reception, the conclusion of the treaty and the free and intimate character of his conversations with Stalin and Molotov.
2. It is not too strong to say that he is thrilled at the change in attitude of the Soviets as compared with his 20 years previous experience and specifically his last visit in 1935.10 As a result of their evident sense of security and self-confidence, modesty and calm have [Page 729] taken the place of their previous aggressiveness and excitability. In Beneš’ view their self-confidence is based on their feeling that their leadership of the Russian people is now secure. The revolution is at last accomplished. Soviet Russia is strong and consolidated for war and for peace. A vigorous nationalism has emerged linked with Russia’s past—Russia for Russians and not a base for international revolution. The Bolshevizing of other countries is no longer an objective. The determination to participate as a powerful nation in world affairs has taken its place.
3. Stalin expressed to Beneš great satisfaction in the new relationships with the U.S. and Britain. Stalin had been much impressed with the President and felt that complete agreement had been reached with him at Tehran11 on all questions not of course in detail but in approach. He gave Beneš the impression that he now felt entirely at ease with the President. Many questions were still unsettled but Stalin indicated confidence that as the result of the over-all understanding mutually satisfactory solutions could be worked out.
Stalin liked and respected Churchill, particularly as a fighting man, one of the personalities who had made the approaching victory possible. But he realized that Churchill at times found it difficult to throw off British nineteenth century imperialism. In addition there were more specific and historical issues between Russia and Britain still to be solved.
In spite of greater sympathy with the United States, Stalin was determined to build a triangular relationship with Britain and the United States and would not play one country against the other. This policy would not preclude bilateral understandings between any two of the three countries on matters of peculiar interest.
Beneš is convinced from the manner in which Stalin expressed himself that he spoke with full sincerity and without reservation. Stalin told Beneš in general terms only of the matters discussed at Tehran. Beneš did not ask for further details and was satisfied the interests of Czechoslovakia were fully protected.
4. As to the treaty, Beneš expressed appreciation of the help the United States had given in supporting his efforts to work it out.
The treaty, he explained, would attain its fullest value only with the inclusion of Poland, to which the President had given his support. Through the three cornered relationship, security could be [garbled groups] Stalin had asked him about the London Polish Government, both individually and collectively. He had told Stalin of his talk [Page 730] with Mikolajczyk12 in London before his departure. Mikolajczyk had shown great suspicion over Soviet intents to Bolshevize Poland and even include it in the Soviet Union. Mikolajczyk had bluntly asked Beneš whether his visit to Moscow would result in Czechoslovakia becoming one of the Soviet republics. When told of this Stalin abruptly sat up in his chair and said “What fools these people are”. Stalin told Beneš he wanted to establish relations with a Polish government but only if he could be sure they would be lasting this time. In answer to Stalin’s inquiry he discussed frankly the personalities in the Polish Government. Stalin was surprised to learn that Mikolajczyk was peasant born and representative of land-owning class. Stalin asked whether it might be possible to get the democratic elements to form government divorced from the reactionaries. Beneš explained that such a government would not have sufficient authority in Poland and would be as impotent as the Yugoslav Government at Cairo.
Beneš told me in strictest confidence the modifications in Soviet frontier claims which, as we know Stalin is prepared to make.
I then asked Beneš what he thought would be the course of events. He said perhaps the only possibility would be to await liberation of Poland, at which time a representative government would arise with which the Soviets could deal. He said he was sure that the Red army would enter Poland with instructions to gain the good will of the Polish people and no attempt would be made to Sovietize Poland. I explained our concern that not all Poles would welcome the Red army under present conditions, and that there might be conflicts from the Polish side, particularly if encouraged by Government in London. In any event the Red army would not have the assistance of the Polish underground. Beneš freely admitted the validity of this concern but, expressed pessimism that anything could be accomplished. I asked him if he knew that Eden had had more satisfactory talks with Mikolajczyk prior to his departure for Cairo. He had not heard of these conversations and said that this altered his views. I urged him not to be defeatist and to keep an open mind until he had had opportunity to discuss the matter with Eden. He said that he would cooperate fully with Mr. Eden and believed that the assurance he could bring to the Poles as the result of his talks with Stalin might well be of real value.
- See the Ambassador’s telegram No. 2284, infra. ↩
- President Beneš was in Moscow June 9–11, 1935, for discussions concerning the peace of Europe and joint security efforts.↩
- For documentation on the conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, with their advisers, at Tehran, November 28–December 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.↩
- Stanislaw Mikolajczyk became Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London on July 14, 1943, after the death of General Sikorski.↩