Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

860F.001/164: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1943—5 p.m.
[Received December 22—5:07 a.m.]

2284. For the President and the Secretary of State. Supplementing my 2264, December 18, 2 p.m. I saw Beneš again this morning for about an hour and a half during which time he talked almost continuously about his further conversations with Stalin and other impressions here.

(1) Poland.

(a) His treaty with Russia would not be complete until Poland was a signatory even if this had to await the conclusion of hostilities with Germany and the establishment of a new government from within.

(b) From further talks with Stalin he was satisfied that a rapprochement between the Soviet Government and the London Polish Government might be effected if Mikolajczyk and the more democratic elements would seek it with sincerity and determination to work with the Soviet Union provided of course that the irreconcilable reactionaries were eliminated. It would be helpful if Witos,¹³ now in Moscow, a member of the Peasant Party and a brother of the former Polish Peasant Party leader,¹⁴ could be brought into the Government. Reconciliation between the Polish military forces fighting on the Russian front and those with the British should also be brought about. The Poles need have no fears of any Soviet intent to Sovietize Poland or to dominate her internal policies.

(c) He told me in the greatest secrecy that Stalin had been more precise about the modification of his frontier demands. He was willing to leave with the Poles Przemysl in the south and Bialystok in the territory in the north. Beneš showed me a map of a possible Polish state which appeared to follow the Curzon line¹⁵ to the east, included east Prussia except for Königsberg and the area north, and bounded on the west by the Oder. He told me that he would explain the above to Eden and would talk in general to the Poles and in more detail if it appeared useful.

I explained to Beneš that the United States Government, as of course he already knew, could not be involved in Polish-Russian boundary questions until the peace negotiations and that although we would like to see a rapprochement between the Polish and Soviet Government primarily for military reasons we could not take part in any way in negotiations for the reconstruction of the Government to suit the Soviets.

(2) Czech-Soviet understandings.

Beneš explained that he had come to a complete agreement with Stalin on all questions,¹⁶ specifically mentioned the following:

(a) Recognition of Czechoslovak territory on the basis of pre-Munich.

(b) Approval by the Soviet Government of the transfer of the German population from the Sudetenland and an exchange with Hungary of the Slovak and Hungarian populations.

(c) Non-interference by the Soviet Government in internal affairs within Czechoslovakia and agreement by the Soviet Government to accord the Ruthenians on the Soviet side of the Carpathians full minority rights.

(d) Beneš stated categorically that he was convinced that there would be no attempt from within Russia to interfere in Czech internal affairs. He had seen Czech Communist leaders now in Moscow who expressed their willingness to join on their return to Czechoslovakia a government under Beneš’ leadership for the purpose of reconstructing a strong nationalist state. He said that in his many talks with different Soviet officials it had frequently been repeated that the Soviet Government had no desire to foster a Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia or in fact in any other European country, but desired stability and strong representative governments.

(3) Yugoslavia.

Stalin had told Beneš that he believed in a continuation of the Yugoslav federation. He was not averse to the King but did not like his present government. He was sympathetic with Tito¹⁷ and Ribar¹⁸ but was open-minded and would not interfere in the natural development of internal politics within the country.

(4) Bulgaria.

Stalin was sympathetic with the Bulgarian people but had no patience with the present government. He was not optimistic that Bulgaria could be induced to withdraw from the war at the present time. In reply to Beneš direct question Stalin said that he had no territorial ambitions toward Bulgaria nor beyond the 1941 frontier anywhere in the Balkans or Turkey. The matter of the Dardanelles should be worked out on an international basis.

(5) Finland.

Stalin had indicated clearly that he would be glad to make peace with Finland on the basis of the March 1940 treaty but expressed himself bitterly against the Finns and considered them stupid in not throwing off their affiliation with Germany.

(6) Confederations.

Beneš said he considered Stalin’s aversion to formation of confederations at the present time as reasonable. He did not however believe that the Soviet Government would object to the subject being considered at an appropriate time although Beneš himself thought the importance of confederations was being overemphasized. He believed that with solid political settlement, economic matters could readily find their solution without formal organization.

(7) Beneš said Stalin repeated his great satisfaction over his association with the President and the Prime Minister, explained in more detail how much he respected the President’s concepts and expressed his belief that with the Prime Minister’s broadminded integrity a satisfactory solution could be found to Anglo-Soviet differences of approach to some of the less important issues. Stalin had repeatedly expressed his confidence in the settlement of world problems under the leadership of the four great powers. He had spoken favorably of the inclusion of China as one of them and had specifically stated that Japan must be destroyed.

Harriman

13. Andrzej Witos, a member of the Presidium of the Congress of the Union of Polish Patriots held in Moscow in June 1943.
14. Wincenty Witos.
15. See footnote 60, p. 659.
16. In telegram No. 2316, December 23, Ambassador Harriman reported that Beneš had told reporters at a press conference that “he considered his trip to the Soviet Union the crowning step in Czechoslovakia’s struggle for independence.” (860F.001/166) A few days later the Ambassador reported in telegram No. 2353, December 29, that Beneš had wired back to Stalin, after leaving Moscow, expressing confidence “that the cooperation of our peoples will constantly become deeper and stronger”. (860F.001/168)
17. Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), a Yugoslav Communist, who emerged during the war as leader of the Yugoslav Partisans.
18. Ivan Ribar, elected in December 1943 President of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoj), the Partisan government formed on November 29, 1943; Chief of State.