Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/1014

Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations⁷⁷

I. The Polish Ambassador has continuously informed the Department of State of all the developments in Polish-Soviet relations since the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement on July 30th, 1941, to the present moment.

II. The following conclusions emerge from this factual documentation:

a) Both as regards the Baltic States and Poland, the USSR has been and is pursuing a policy aiming at the annexation of these countries,

b) this policy has been carefully thought out and prepared with a, view of creating the impression that the populations of the countries, in question desire their incorporation in the USSR,

c) in her attempt to create this illusion calculated to impress British and American public opinion,—the USSR has largely benefited by her successful defense, by the ignorance of Soviet mentality and methods which characterizes British and American public opinion, by the traditional secrecy with which all Soviet internal affairs are surrounded, by the fact that at the time when Soviet Russia alleges to have carried out “popular consultations” during her occupation of these countries, she was allied to Nazi Germany and her activities in those countries were practically outside any possible control on the part of the Allied Powers,

d) since that time, however, reliable information has become available which proves that:

1) no acceptable popular consultations had taken place,

2) Soviet military and political authorities ruthlessly terrorized the population of these countries and deported millions of men, women and children to Russia and applied mass sovietization in those areas entirely disregarding all international laws-defining the rights of an occupying power.

3) During the occupation of the above mentioned countries, intense communisation was forcibly being introduced.

III. Ever since Germany’s attack on the USSR, Soviet Russian diplomacy and her widespread and intensive propaganda in Great Britain and the United States have diligently tended to prepare the way for the territorial claims recently openly put forward by the Soviet Government.

In putting forward her demands the USSR has, as far as diplomacy is concerned, made use of gradually increasing pressure on the Polish Government and the British and U.S. Government, and of methods of virtual blackmail (second front, insufficient support etc.), while her propaganda, methodically conducted by means of newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and speeches, maps and by other means,—has mostly taken the form of familiarizing British and American public opinion with Russia’s allegedly inalienable rights to these territories with the obvious aim of taking full advantage of ignorance and war enthusiasm for Russia’s part in the war to obtain the tacit recognition and acceptance of unilaterally created accomplished facts.

Soviet Russia has been singularly assisted in this work by numerous American and British propagandists who for various reasons have seen fit to espouse her cause in their respective countries.

IV. Having prepared the background, the Soviets launched their territorial claims after having informed the Polish Government of their decision to withdraw the right of Polish citizenship of the Polish citizens deported by them to the USSR at the time of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. The incredible reason given in the said note of January 16th, 1943, was the refusal of the Polish Government to recognize the sovereign rights of the USSR to these Polish territories, termed in the note as the territories of Western Ukraina and White Ruthenia.

This novel method of procedure contrary to all laws and usages governing international relations, requires no comment,—and is clearly inadmissible.

V. The Polish Government had “bona fide” concluded the agreement with the USSR of July 30, 1941, disregarding the Soviet attack on Poland of September 17th, 1939, which had finally crippled her resistance in her defense against Germany, and shelving all the unspeakable wrongs inflicted by the Soviet Government on the Polish population.

In doing so the Polish Government proved its farsighted statesmanship and its determination to remain actively solidary with Poland’s Ally Great Britain in the war and to place the vital issue of future peaceful collaboration between European nations above all other matters.

In the opening paragraph of this Polish-Soviet agreement the high contracting parties agreed to regard the German-Soviet agreement partitioning Poland’s territory as no longer operative. Logically therefore Poland was entitled to regard that the Polish-Soviet agreement restored the “status quo ante” of the territorial delimitation of Poland’s Eastern boundaries fixed by virtue of the Riga Treaty of March 18th, 1921,⁷⁸ and recognized by the Allied Powers on March 15, 1923.⁷⁹

Ever since July 1941, however, the USSR Government has taken every opportunity to place in doubt these legally established Polish boundaries and has gone out of its way to bring pressure to bear upon the Polish Government, by means inadmissible in normal relations between civilized countries, and contrary to the specific terms of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration signed by the United Nations, to both of which the USSR is a signatory.

The documentary evidence supplied by the Polish Government to the Department of State contains numerous instances of bad faith on the part of the Soviet Government in its dealings with the Polish Government and definite instances of non-fulfilment by the Soviet Government of its signed obligations.

VI. It must be reluctantly admitted that the Soviet Government is interpreting the lack of any direct reaction to Soviet claims on Poland on the part of the Chief Allies, as a proof of their indifference and even decision not to support Poland’s legitimate territorial rights.

This has served to encourage the USSR in the belief that Poland was isolated, that she could not count upon the firm support of the principal United Nations, and has convinced the Soviets that they could pursue their policy of territorial annexation without encountering any opposition.

VII. As a result of the facts enumerated above the situation has at present reached a climax which threatens to force a rupture between Soviet Russia and Poland. It is probable, on the basis of certain indications, that the USSR will try to set up (provisionally on its own territory),—a communist Polish puppet government (similar to that which she prepared when she invaded Poland in 1920) with a view to its establishment on Polish territory as soon as the Soviet army reaches Poland.

VIII. From the legal viewpoint the case for Poland is unassailable:

a) The Eastern frontiers of Poland have been definitely established in a freely negotiated treaty with Soviet Russia signed at Riga on March 18th, 1921;

b) these boundaries have been duly recognized by all sovereign States;

c) they have never been questioned by the USSR in the course of the peace period until the present time;

d) the populations of these territories have never expressed any desire to have these territories incorporated in the USSR although there were 37 Ukrainian representatives of this territory in the Polish Parliament;

e) the USSR claim is definitely contrary to agreements signed with Poland and especially to the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

IX. In the case of Poland, an active member of the United Nations, the first Nation who actively opposed German aggression, the only one who has not had one single Quisling, one who has succeeded in maintaining under most difficult conditions uninterrupted contact with its nation and can rightly claim to represent it,—the conduct of the USSR, herself one of the four fighting United Nations, must be regarded as an open challenge to the principles laid down for the United Nations Concept.

In the light of this fact, and considering that the USSR is a totalitarian communist Dictatorship whose basic principles and policies have never in the past shown any tendency towards democratic principles and ideals, her present attitude towards Poland is highly symptomatic and probably constitutes merely a test case aimed at the disruption of United Nations’ ideology.

If the USSR were to succeed in her designs to subject Poland or part of Poland, the way would be opened for her to further territorial demands by means of blackmail, based on her present part in the war.

X. Poland has an army of over 80,000 men at present in the final stages of training in the Middle East. The families of these soldiers, contrary to a solemn promise given by the Soviet Government, have been prevented from leaving Russia and are virtually held as hostages in the USSR and are being forced by beatings and starvation to “accept” Soviet citizenship.

It would seem that preservation of the morale and fighting spirit of this reserve army, so conveniently placed, is of direct interest to the United Nations effort. Recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations directly endanger the morale of these Polish soldiers and the ferment already noticeable among them is a matter of grave concern to the Polish Government and to General Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. Dissatisfaction will inevitably also spread to the Polish Army, Air force and Navy in Great Britain.

General Sikorski has succeeded under most difficult conditions in organizing guerilla detachments and army units in Poland proper. This force is secretly preparing for the eleventh hour and counts several hundred thousand men who will become most useful to the United Nations war effort at the decisive period of the war. Their reliability and consequently the possibility of using them as a considerable organized force against Germany will undoubtedly depend on the attitude of the USSR to Poland.

These pregnant military considerations cannot be lightly brushed aside by the United States and Great Britain.

Finally, some consideration should be given to the position of General Sikorski himself. He initiated and carried out his policy of friendly collaboration with Russia in the face of considerable opposition both within his government and on the part of some important groups of Polish public opinion. He persevered, on the understanding that his policy was approved and would receive the necessary support on the part of the British and the U.S. Governments.

It is becoming increasingly probable that only firm and active American and British support by means of effective interventions in Moscow can allow him to maintain his undisputed authority in Poland and among the Polish people abroad and the Polish Armed Forces, and enable General Sikorski to pursue his policy towards the USSR.

March 22, 1943.

77. Forwarded by the Polish Ambassador with a covering personal note on March 22, 1943, to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Loy W. Henderson.
78. Treaty of peace between Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, p. 123.
79. See Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, p. 795.