760C.61/1014
Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations and Their Bearing on Soviet-United Nations Relationship80
A survey of facts pertaining to the development of Polish-Soviet relations leads to the following conclusions:
1) Soviet Russia’s claims to Polish territory are contrary to signed agreements and treaties and to the principles declared in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.
2) As far as the USSR is concerned, her territorial claims are a test case intended to prove the sincerity of these principles and the degree of importance attached by the Democratic Powers to their maintenance.
3) Failure on the part of the Principal United Nations to support these principles can result in the serious danger of disruption of the United Nations unity, the loss of faith in the sincerity of the declared United Nations war aims and slogans among the armed forces and the populations of the invaded and oppressed countries.
4) The loss of faith and hope among those Nations, coupled with constant and exclusive German propaganda exhorting them to join Germany in fighting the Soviet Communist menace, may have grave results. It may lead to despair, internal strife, anarchy and communism. [Page 359] (The Soviets are continuously spreading communist propaganda in those countries by means of radio broadcasts and agents).
5) The argument spread by the Soviets that opposition by the Principal United Nations to Soviet territorial claims might result in the conclusion of a separate Soviet-German peace should be entirely rejected.
6) While the possibility of the conclusion of such a separate peace should not be entirely disregarded if Germany were to offer the USSR adequate territorial and other advantages at an appropriate time, this rather remote possibility could not be prevented by a passive attitude towards Soviet territorial claims on the part of the United States and Great Britain or, in fact, by anything the two Powers might or might not do at present. On the contrary, the danger of such an eventuality would be enhanced by any tacit or expressed recognition of USSR claims on German occupied territories.
To those who understand the intricacies of Russian mentality it is clear that the pressure for such recognition will rather tend to increase in proportion to the development of a tendency on the part of Stalin to a separate peace. Stalin’s realism, based on peasant logic, spurs him to preserve a free hand in all his dealings at all cost and by all the means at his disposal. Rightly or wrongly he has probably gained the certainty that the United States and Great Britain will never fight against Russia. At present, still at an undecided phase of the war, the territories he covets are held by Germany. He may obtain them from Germany by conquest or by concession in a separate peace. As a distrustful realist hitherto unimpressed by the military power of the United States and Great Britain, he most probably admits that the defeat and surrender of Germany may not be complete and unconditional. He may likewise be apprehensive as regards the possibility of an Anglo-American negotiated peace with Germany in the case of an unduly long war. In all and every eventuality he aims at ensuring his gains.
If the United Nations are victorious,—the advanced recognition of his territorial aspirations would insure him against future negotiations and bargaining within the United Nations camp.
In case of a negotiated peace, such advanced recognition would force the United Nations to register his claims on Germany as one of their joint peace aims.
Advanced recognition of Stalin’s territorial claims by the principal Allies would be especially useful to him, and in fact might en-courage him, if at a given moment and in favorable circumstances, he were contemplating the conclusion of a separate peace. If Germany, unburdened in the East by the conclusion of such a peace were not finally defeated by the United Nations, his territorial gains conceded by Germany would have been already sanctioned by the Allies and [Page 360] would thus be recognized by both sides. If Germany were completely defeated after a German-Soviet separate peace, he could still count on retaining his territorial gains, previously recognized by the Allies.
7) Stalin’s realism appears to be frequently misinterpreted.
That realism forces him, above all else, to reckon with the United States and with American public opinion, while, at the same time, it prompts him to take fullest advantage of his temporarily unique position as the foremost actively fighting Power in the United Nations camp.
As such, his conduct and tactics in relation to the Allies will be calculated to make the most of his advantages within the limits dictated to him by cunning and by the necessity to obtain all the help and support without which he can neither hope to continue fighting on so large a scale, to feed his population or to rebuild his devastated country.
How greatly he reckons with the United States and American public opinion which Soviet propaganda has done so much to gain, is amply proved by his immediate favorable reaction to Ambassador Standley’s press statement on Lend-Lease services.81
8) Every serious expert on Soviet Russian mentality certainly knows that Russian realism can only be influenced by a like display of realism.
Contrary to German realism which only reacts to directly applied force, Russian realism will react to a definitely worded statement and will be influenced by strong realistic arguments.
It should always be remembered that Russians suffer from a deep inferiority complex which is especially apparent in their dealings with persons of Western civilization and particularly with Anglo-Saxons and Americans. Like many shy persons, Russians frequently adopt an overbearing and exacting attitude to cover their inferiority complex. In reality this defense can be easily broken through.
9) At this psychological moment in American-Soviet relations their entire future depends on the firm reassertion by the United States Government that it will not sacrifice its principles to Soviet imperialism.