760C.61/3–2243
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)
The Polish Ambassador called upon me this morning. He said that he had come to request an appointment with the Secretary on the earliest possible date since his Government had requested him to deliver personally to Mr. Hull a communication.
The Ambassador handed me the attached note dated March 20, 194373 and stated that this was the communication which he was instructed to give to the Secretary and to discuss with him. He was giving it to me to transmit to the Secretary in order that the Secretary might acquaint himself with its contents before their conversation.
He would also inform the Secretary orally during the coming interview that his Government had instructed him to state categorically that it had been at no time prepared and was not at present prepared to make any concessions whatsoever which might threaten the territorial integrity of Poland or deprive Polish citizens of their right to Polish citizenship.
[Page 353]The Ambassador also gave me the attached document prepared by the Polish Embassy entitled “Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations and their bearing on Soviet-United Nations relationship”.74 He said he would appreciate it if this document would be shown to the Secretary and if a copy of it would be sent to the President. He also promised to send me, and he did so later in the day, a further memorandum on Polish-Soviet relations75 which he also desired to have sent to the President and to be marked as memorandum number 1. A copy of this memorandum is also attached hereto.
During our conversation he handed me another document entitled “Memorandum on the Origin of the ‘Curzon Line’”76 which he said might be of assistance to the press section of the Department. He thought that this memorandum might help to clear up certain misconceptions with regard to the so-called “Curzon Line”.
The Ambassador said that he was particularly perturbed regarding the attitude which the Soviet Government is showing at present towards Poland. He felt that only through intervention on the part of the United States and Great Britain could any change in that attitude be effected. The Soviet Government in his opinion had the impression that the failure of Great Britain and the United States to intervene on behalf of Poland was indicative that those two countries had lost interest in Poland and were willing to allow the Soviet Union to do what it wished in Eastern Europe. He feared if the Soviet Union continued to remain adamant that the Polish Army, which is becoming extremely restive, would lose all respect for General Sikorski and that General Sikorski’s position with members of the Polish Council would be seriously undermined. There are more than three hundred thousand Poles in Poland who are organized and prepared to arise in revolt at a signal from the Polish Government. These Poles are sworn to oppose every threat to Polish territorial integrity regardless of the direction from which it might arise. They are already beginning to inquire what attitude they should take in case Soviet forces should again enter the Polish frontier. The Germans have been clever in deporting to those parts of Poland which are claimed by the Soviet Union large numbers of Polish patriots. There is a danger that these Poles, many of whom are armed may actively oppose the Soviet entrance into Poland if the situation remains unchanged.
The Ambassador referred to an article which appeared according to his understanding in the Chicago Tribune of yesterday and to [Page 354] another article recently published in the New York Herald Tribune. These articles indicate that the President has been persuaded by Eden to acquiesce to Soviet claims in Eastern Europe. The Ambassador said that he could not believe that these allegations were true. I told him that I had no information regarding the conversations which had taken place between the President and Mr. Eden.
The Ambassador said he would also like to inquire during his conversation with the Secretary what the attitude of the American Government might be in case the Soviet Government should sever relations with the Polish Government and towards a Polish request that the American Government take over Polish affairs in the Soviet Union.
- Not printed, but see footnote 72, above.↩
- Post, p. 358.↩
- Infra. ↩
- Not printed; for an account of the note of July 10, 1920, from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Curzon) to the Soviet Government delineating the “Curzon Line”, see Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp. 793–794.↩