Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, Volume III

760C.61/1012: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

London, March 19, 1943—midnight.
[Received March 20—12:10 a.m.]

Polish Series [No.] 8. Reference my Polish Series No. 7, March 16 [6], 4 p.m., regarding part of conversation between Stalin and Polish Ambassador Romer dealing with question of granting Polish deportees choice between Polish and Russian citizenship, Sikorski expresses serious concern over further deterioration of Polish-Russian relations as indicated by message just received from Ambassador Romer. Following are the main points thereof:

(a) While Romer was negotiating with Molotov and associates the Soviet authorities were attempting to force Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. Those who refused, and these were in the majority, were being arrested, kept without food and beaten. For example, in Kirov about 200 Polish citizens were arrested for refusing to accept Soviet passports and some of them instantly condemned to 2 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, the Soviet authorities rarely, if ever, tried to ascertain the places of birth of the Poles.

(b) In view of these steadily multiplying conditions, and in event of unfavorable outcome from his forthcoming talks with Molotov, Homer suggested that the Polish Government appeal for more energetic support of the United States and British Governments.⁷² He was confident of effective results from such support.

(c) Romer feared that in case all other means proved unsuccessful, he would be obliged to advise his Government to break diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, he sincerely hoped this might be avoided in view of its potential bearing on the United Nations war effort and, among other factors, the position of the Poles in Russia.

(d) Romer suggested that his Government send strong note to-Russian Ambassador Bogomolov here, protesting against the imposition of Soviet citizenship on Poles, as well as against the taking over of Polish properties, asylums, hostels, et cetera, by the Russian authorities.

In requesting that I apprise you of the foregoing and of his opinion that the situation was rapidly becoming more serious, Sikorski expressed his earnest hope that we and the British might see our way clear to strengthen Romer’s hand in his forthcoming conversations with Molotov.

[Biddle]

72. Acting upon instructions from his Government, Ambassador Ciechanowski on March 22 presented a note, dated March 20, which declared that “only an immediate and energetic intervention undertaken in Moscow by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain would have the desired effect” of forestalling a failure in Polish-Soviet negotiations with all the “undesirable effects it could not fail to have upon the unity of the United Nations.” (760C.61/1014)