740.0011 European War 1939/27116
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
| Participants: | The President; |
| Ambassador of Chile, Señor Don Rodolfo Michels; | |
| Chilean Minister of Interior, Sr. Raúl Morales Beltrami; | |
| Under Secretary, Mr. Welles |
Today at noon the President received the Chilean Ambassador, Señor Morales and myself. Señor Morales asked me to give the President the attached statement which he had prepared in writing57 in view of his inability to express himself fluently in English. The President read the message and said that he fully realized the difficulty of preparing any democracy “spiritually”, referring to the statement of the Chilean Minister of the Interior contained in the written declaration that it had been necessary “materially and spiritually” to arm Chile in order to convert her into an ally and not into a defense problem.
The Minister then stated that he was the bearer of a personal message to the President from the President of Chile that Chile had decided immediately to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.
The President replied that he was very glad indeed to receive this information and then explained to the Minister at some length the difficulties and dangers the United States had encountered in the World War of 1914–1918 on account of espionage and clandestine radio activities which were then taking place under Axis auspices in Mexico. The President explained how these had been checked. The President then continued by saying that very much the same sort of dangers had been occasioned the United States by the Axis subversive activities which had taken place in Chile until very recently and that, while he was very sorry to have to mention this fact, it nevertheless was a fact. The President then said that he felt sure that the step which the Government of Chile now contemplated would prove to be in the interest of Chile herself, that the situation of the United Nations had improved very materially in the last few months, and that for Chile to join the democracies in the manner proposed would inevitably be a happy solution to the problem which Chile had encountered. He went on to explain why it was essential for the United Nations to concentrate upon defeating Germany first, since if Germany was defeated, Japan was inevitably defeated likewise, whereas if the United States concentrated on defeating Japan first, the defeat of Germany would be long postponed.
[Page 42]Señor Morales then raised the question of the dangers to which Chile would be exposed when she broke relations. The President said that Japan was not in a position to do any real damage to Chile, that the most that Japan could do would be to send a submarine, fire a few shells on the Chilean coast, as Japan had done against the California coast some six months ago, and that the effect had simply been to stimulate the morale of the people of California and the same result would occur if Japan attempted the same action against Chile. Señor Morales raised the question of the defenseless character of such strategic points on the Chilean coast as electric power stations, upon which the supply of copper depended. The President suggested that he discuss these details with me at a meeting which we were due to have this afternoon.
The conversation concluded by the Minister saying to the President that his mission here was to inform the United States Government that the policy of Chile had never been un-inter-American and had always been designed to cooperate in the defense of the Western Hemisphere. He also requested that the message he had communicated to the President be regarded as confidential, since only the President of Chile himself should announce the intention of the Chilean Government to break relations with the Axis powers.
The Minister likewise left with the President a long memorandum58 written in Spanish which I said I would have translated and give to the President, and I also told the President that the Minister had a personal letter addressed to the President by the President of Chile which the Minister would give me later and which I would give to the President.59