740.0011 European War 1939/25883: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Bowers)
1435. Your 2016, November 20, 5 p.m.55 From the Under Secretary. You will recall that prior to Ambassador Michels’ return to the United States at the end of last July, there was no thought of an invitation to President Ríos to visit the United States. The invitation was only extended after Ambassador Michels, on behalf of President Ríos, had assured President Roosevelt in the most authoritative and official manner that President Ríos was prepared to do everything which might be considered necessary for the security of the continent. The President expressed his appreciation and said that the most effective step Chile could take for the security of the hemisphere was rupture of diplomatic relations by Chile with the Axis. The President then extended the invitation to President Ríos. Shortly thereafter, a list of war materials which could be made available to Chile following a break in relations was furnished to Ambassador Michels and by him to General Espinosa and to the appropriate authorities in Santiago.
Thereafter and until the date of my speech at Boston, Chile did nothing whatever to indicate that Ambassador Michels’ statement to President Roosevelt had been anything more than empty verbiage. President Ríos did plan to come to the United States, leaving Santiago some 10 weeks after the invitation was extended. The invitation itself was used throughout this period and continues to be used as a motive [Page 40] for delaying the break in relations. In other words, what President Roosevelt thought would facilitate the attainment of what he had been given to understand was a common desire of the two governments, namely, the elimination of highly prejudicial Axis diplomatic and subversive activity in this continent, was used by the Chilean authorities and is still being used by them to delay the attainment of this objective.
The invitation to Ríos still stands. If and when he comes, regardless of the action which Chile may have taken to live up to her commitments, he will, of course, receive a courteous welcome in official circles. However, in view of the very natural war-time psychology prevalent in the United States, which psychology is, as you will recognize, one of our major assets in the conduct of the war, it has been thought desirable to ask you to indicate clearly to President Ríos our misgivings as to the type of popular and press reception which he would receive if he were to take advantage of President Roosevelt’s invitation before carrying out the official and authoritative commitment as a result of which that invitation was extended. (I refer in this connection to my personal letter to you of November 19).56
It also seems desirable that you bear in mind the effect upon the Chilean position of the passage of time. The United States has now been in the war nearly a year. Ten months have elapsed since Rio. Nearly four months have passed since President Ríos told President Roosevelt that he would do anything necessary for continental security. According to the “authoritative and official commitment” which Fernández and Ríos have given you, there will be no rupture of relations until the return of Ríos from his trip. In other words, the German, Japanese and Italian diplomatic and consular agents in Chile are guaranteed at the very least another three months of immunity.
The Department concurs with you that matters may be allowed to rest as they are and that you should limit yourself to such repetition of the Department’s views as previously expressed as may in your judgment be useful. [Welles.]