Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

890D.00/914: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

London , September 15, 1942—8 p.m.
[Received 10:43 p.m.]

5168. My telegram 4970, September 4, midnight.¹⁵ This morning Eden¹⁶ handed me an aide-mémoire in answer to my aide-mémoire based on the Department’s 4106, August 27, midnight. He made the following verbal statement of policy to me in relation to the areas affected. He told me that because of the necessities of war British policy was based, first, on military might, second, on contributions of money and materials such as half a million pounds of air raid protection in Iraq, third, the driving out or arrest of Quislings or enemy spies and, fourth, on propaganda which warned against the “Herrenvolk” using as an example the action of the Italians against the Arabs in Tripoli which is known in that area. He hoped very much that nothing we would do would controvert that policy but that in what we do we would give general support to it. He is not as pessimistic as we are in regard to this territory and feels that under all the circumstances, with the reverses in Russia and earlier British reverses in Libya, the situation has stood up well. He recognizes that Syria is a weak spot but General de Gaulle¹⁷ has just agreed to return to London. I have not taken this up with the Fighting French pending a reply from the British and in view of the nature of this reply I feel it inopportune to do so.

The Prime Minister himself is opposed to the language of the declaration and he asks that if we decide to issue a modified declaration the British be given an opportunity to see it before issuance.

The aide-mémoire follows:

“His Majesty’s Government have not failed to give most careful attention to the aide-mémoire received from the American Embassy under date August 31, in which the opinion of His Majesty’s Government is invited on certain political action contemplated by the United States Government in the Middle East, and on the proposed despatch of a special American mission to those regions.

2. His Majesty’s Government fully appreciate the wish of the United States Government to utilize for the purposes of the war all the great reserves of good will which the United States has undoubtedly built up in the Middle East by decades of philanthropic and cultural enterprise. They agree that it is highly desirable to make the most effective use possible of these reserves, and of the great influence which the United States enjoy, for other reasons, in those territories as elsewhere, and they cordially welcome the intention of the United States Government to appoint a diplomatic agent in Syria and the Lebanon. As regards the proposed public declaration, His Majesty’s Government recognize the value of any step that would stimulate the Middle Eastern peoples to increase the degree of their participation in the resistance to the Axis aggressors, and if the United States Government are of the opinion that this object can satisfactorily be advanced by the issue of a declaration, His Majesty’s Government would not wish to raise objection. At the same time, they must in all frankness say that they see very considerable dangers in addressing a statement in the form proposed to the regions in question, and should the United States Government be prepared as His Majesty’s Government sincerely hope to reconsider the wording of the draft statement His Majesty’s Government would greatly appreciate an opportunity to consider any revised formula.

3. In the first place, the stress laid in the draft declaration on the promotion of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ appears inappropriate when applied to a region in which all the countries specified, with the exceptions of Palestine and Transjordania and the possible further exception of the Levant States, already enjoy independence qualified only by the exigencies of the war situation and the requirements of the Allied forces operating within their boundaries.

4. Such a declaration followed by the announcement on the American side of the intention to despatch a special mission would, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, incur the precise risk of strengthening that Axis influence and that Axis propaganda which it is the express intention of the proposal to combat. The meaning of the draft declaration would infallibly be taken in the countries to which it is intended to apply as containing both an implication that ‘liberty’ is being withheld and an assurance that it is the intention of the United States Government to hasten its achievement. No implications could be more welcome to Axis propaganda, could be more readily turned against the occupying forces or could be more calculated to increase the tension of the existing situation and to threaten the security of the Allied command.

5. On the other hand, and as regards the areas covered by the proposed mission which do enjoy full independence, His Majesty’s Government cannot but feel that the suggested mission and the draft declaration are liable to be misinterpreted as regards Palestine both by Jews and Arabs in a sense which could hardly fail to have dangerous repercussions. As regards Syria and the Lebanon as the United States Government are aware, the situation is complicated in so far as the fulfillment of the Anglo-French recognition of independence is impeded by the obstruction of the Fighting French to recognition of, and administration, while the tense military situation in Egypt renders it difficult for His Majesty’s Government on their side to apply the pressure which they would otherwise wish to bring. American help in securing this fulfillment, afforded at the right time and in the right manner, will be heartily welcomed by His Majesty’s Government. But the proposals now advanced, in so far as they refer to these areas seem to His Majesty’s Government calculated to provoke a state of popular agitation and excitement which, at the present time, it would be very difficult to meet.

6. A special word must be said about Turkey. Although His Majesty’s Government feel that the proposed declaration is hardly appropriate to that country, they are anxious to make clear that the arrangements which the United States Government may wish to make for the utilization, and the increase, in the interest of the United Nations war effort, their undoubted influence in Turkey are, in the view of His Majesty’s Government, essentially a question between the United States and the Turkish Government. His Majesty’s Government for their part, if only in view of their Treaty of Alliance with Turkey and the delicate political situation in regard to that country, welcome the evident readiness of the United States Government to keep them acquainted with the action which they may propose to take.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. In respect of the other activities mentioned in the Embassy’s memorandum, His Majesty’s Government would welcome the appointment of specialized American personnel to work with the appropriate British authorities on all these matters. In general they welcome the intention of the United States Government that American propaganda should be greatly and rapidly increased in the interest of the United Nations war effort throughout the Middle East where the soil, for the reasons pointed out in the American Embassy memorandum, should be peculiarly fertile.”¹⁸

Winant

15. Not printed.
16. Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
17. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Leader of the Free French Forces.
18. It is stated in The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948) vol. ii, p. 1500, that this proposal for a declaration of policy on the Near East was abandoned in consequence of the British reaction.