Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

740.0011 European War 1939/23914a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant )

Washington , August 27, 1942—midnight.

4106. Part I.⁸ The following plan has been discussed with the President and has his general approval:

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have for some time been giving special consideration to the situation in the Near East and have discussed with the State Department the serious consequences for the United Nations if this area were lost. They feel that every possible effort, both political and military, must be made to hold this vital area.

2. The United States still holds a unique position in the Near East and American prestige and influence is still high. This results from a realization by the people of the area that the United States has no territorial or vested political interests there. Furthermore, since actions speak louder than words, this widespread goodwill toward the United States has become what might be described as a deep-seated conviction on the part of the peoples in this area, due mainly to a century of American missionary, educational and philanthropic efforts that have never been tarnished by any material motives or interests. No other member of the United Nations is in such a position.

3. Although large American military forces are not now available for the protection of the Near East, there are weapons in the field of American political action and propaganda that we are in a position to contribute to help hold this area.

4. In the political field, in an effort to help this critical situation, the State Department has under contemplation two specific steps as follows:

a. The issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is included as Part II of this telegram.⁹

b. The appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria.¹⁰

5. A further step is also contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the Near East remains primarily a British theater of military responsibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an American Mission, part military part economic, might, because of the standing of the United States, be able to help hold this area, and they have in mind sending to the Near East as soon as possible such an American Mission.

6. An initial activity of this Mission will be to make an economic survey of the area. …

7. The major and positive function of another section of such an American Mission will be to capitalize on the existing goodwill toward the United States and, as a result to gain more active support of the peoples of this area for a United Nations’ victory. The main efforts of this section of this Mission … will be in the field of political warfare and of propaganda. This will require, on the one hand, the closest collaboration with the American consular and diplomatic representatives in this area, and, on the other hand, with the local representatives of OWI¹¹ who will actually do the propaganda work. Personal contact with influential leaders in the various areas of the Near East will, from the start, be a major function of the head of this Mission.

8. American propaganda throughout the Near East will be increased enormously and quickly in both volume and effectiveness over what has been done to date. It has already been discussed with OWI that there should be made available in the shortest possible time an increased amount of American news for Arabic newspapers, an efficient photo newspaper service, pamphlets, gadgets, etc. as are being offered in other parts of the world.

9. For effective coordination the activities of this Mission must of course be subject to the general control of the American theater commander. Full cooperation with all other American Government agencies operative in this area is being arranged before the Mission leaves for the Near East.

10. In its work in the Near East, this American Mission must operate, although in close cooperation with the British and the Fighting French, as an independent American organization and not, as may be suspected, as a “front” for the French and British. Its principal arguments will be:

a. The military power and potentialities of the United Nations.

b. The inevitable fate of the peoples of the Near East in case of Axis victory—political and economic enslavement as in all occupied countries.

c. The self-interest of the Near East peoples and their better prospects for political and economic development as a result of a United Nations’ victory.

d. The assurance of the support of the United States for their aspirations to independence after the war if, in line with American foreign policy and the Atlantic Charter,¹² these peoples actively assist in winning it.

11. Such an American Mission will naturally cover the same theater as the Middle East Command but its primary efforts will be aimed at the Arabic speaking world of the Near East—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Arabia, Iraq, and, because of physical location, Turkey and Iran.

Official headquarters will be in the same place as the British Middle East Command. Operating headquarters probably will be established in Beirut, Lebanon, with subsidiary headquarters in each of the political areas listed above.

12. The proposed head of this Mission is Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, Army of the United States, for the past year and a half in the State Department and now on an indefinite leave of absence. Colonel Hoskins, who was born in Beirut of American missionary parents, speaks Arabic, French, German and Spanish. During the last war he was a Captain in the 5th Regiment Marines, 2nd U.S. Division, wounded and decorated. Since then he has been in the cotton goods business in the United States but has continued to travel widely in Southern Europe and the Near East. He is also Vice-President of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. It seems advisable that such an effort should be made, and the results can be substantial, especially as this Mission will be going out with the full support of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, and it is hoped with prior agreement as to its American character and activities by the British political and military authorities.

15. Please discuss this project with the Foreign Office and other competent British officials and endeavor to get their concurrence in

(1) the two steps contemplated by the State Department, including the issuance of the proposed declaration of United States Government policy toward the Near East. This statement is in the opinion of this Department the minimum that can be effectively said. If the British suggest or prefer that such a statement be issued by our diplomatic representatives in the Near East rather than announced from Washington, you are authorized to accept such a compromise; for maximum effect, however, this statement should be issued in Washington by the President or the Secretary of State.

(2) the operation of the American Mission along the lines outlined above.

16. Please transmit a copy of this instruction to General Bolte¹³ and ask him to discuss this project with the Fighting French National Committee and to endeavor to get their concurrence also to the points in paragraph 15.

17. In view of the urgency of this matter, you are requested to obtain British and French approval and cable us their concurrence at the earliest possible moment.

Part II follows as Department’s 4107.

Hull

8. Telegram sent in two sections, Part I as No. 4106 and Part II as No. 4107.
9. Infra.
10. For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 641 ff.
11. Office of War Information.
12. Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.
13. Brig. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, United States representative to deal with the Free French on military matters.