891.24/195: Telegram
The Minister in Iran ( Dreyfus ) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 10—1:55 p.m.]
147. Department’s No. 113, May 5, 8 p.m.
- 1.
- Following estimate of motor vehicles in Iran compiled by Legation after consulting Iranian Government, private sources, and UKCC. (a) Trucks now operating 4,000, laid up for lack of tires and parts, 1500. This includes all Government and private trucks except Russian and British military. UKCC have about half of these 4,000 trucks under contract and in addition are expecting arrival soon of some 2500 Lease-Lend trucks for their use. (b) Busses, 600. (c) Passenger cars now operating 3,000, laid up 1,000. (d) Motorcycles, 400. Almost all of above vehicles are in private hands.
- 2.
- Estimate of tire needs: Allowing 12 tires per truck per year (mortality rate is high due to bad roads) and 2 for each passenger car, it would appear that British estimate of 68,000 fairly reflects [Page 130] minimum needs for Allied military and Iranian civilian use. Iranian Government is unaware that orders for 68,000 tires have been placed; they themselves having ordered only 24,000 through UKCC. If 68,000 tires actually arrive in Iran and are distributed roughly along lines suggested by UKCC, I am of opinion that Iran’s minimum needs would be met.
- 3.
- Distribution: This is delicate and controversial point. The UKCC wishes to control distribution of tires because (1) they do not trust Iranians to do it honestly (2) they believe they can do it more efficiently and (3) it would be an excellent economic weapon. The Iranians ardently desire to have tires delivered directly to them and to control distribution. Iranian Government has recently given to UKCC virtual control over tire imports because they had become convinced that only the UKCC wielded sufficient influence to obtain tires. Thus, the 24,000 tires in question were ordered through UKCC. Now however that Lease-Lend aid has been granted Iran,14 the Iranian Government would be most displeased if control over tires was placed in hands of UKCC.
I should be most reluctant to see tire control vested solely in UKCC because (1) it would aggravate Iranians and some of the blame might be placed on us, (2) it would increase the strangle hold which the UKCC is gradually acquiring over Iranian economy. In addition I do not see why British should have the credit for this transaction which might well be handled as Lease-Lend aid to Iran. On other hand I do not have confidence in ability or honesty of Iranian Government to make equitable distribution. The best solution would be in the sending of Lease-Lend representative or commission to control matters of this kind. The Iranians would welcome such an official and the British could hardly object since they have frequently suggested that the Iranians engage an American to supervise distribution of essential goods. The next best solution would be distribution of these by a mixed commission of Iranians, British and Americans, a procedure to which the Iranian Government has indicated it would agree.